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Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation
Rules and the Common Law
James A. R. Nafziger"
The Complex Litigation Project of the American Law Institute includes a
significant scheme of choice-of-law rules in state created actions.' The core
provision, Section 6.01 ("Mass Torts"), adopts a "single state" approach to
govern consolidated claims, by which one state's tort law is to be applied to all
similar claims against each defendant.2
Three sets of significant contacts 3 enable courts to identify states4 whose
policies would be furthered by application of their laws. In selecting among the
laws of two or more interested states, the court is to be guided by a prioritized
list of preference rules.5 Two concluding subsections 6 provide safety valves.
The first safety valve permits a court to avoid an unfair surprise or arbitrary
result by selecting a more appropriate law than the prescribed analysis would
indicate. The second permits a court to subdivide cases by claims, issues, or
parties when it would be inappropriate to lump them together for choice-of-law
purposes. The result may be to sever, transfer, or remand issues as appropriate.
Copyright 1994. by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law. Willamette University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Ming Ye in the preparation of the Annex to this article.
I. The American Law Institute. Complex Litigation Project, Proposed Final Draft §§ 6.01-.07
(May 13, 1993) thereinafter Proposed Final Draftl. The atthor was a member of the Project's
Consultative Group.
2. Section 6.01 is to govern consolidated mass tort actions in a disinterested or neutral federal
court. Its central purpose is to avoid forum-shopping and to simplify the choice.of-law process in
complex litigation. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at 376. Ideally, the rules would become federal law.
3. Id. § 6.01(b) (place(s) of: injury, conduct causing the injury, and business or habitual
residences of the plaintiffs and defendants).
4. Id. § 6.01(c). The rules speak in terms of "states" in the domestic sense but are of course
applicable in cases with international contacts unless international law is dispositive.
5. First, if the place of both the injury and the conduct causing the injury are the same. that
state's law governs. Id. § 6.01(c)(l). Second, if the first preference does not apply, but all of the
plaintiffs habitually reside or have their principal places of business in the same state. and a
defendant has its principal place of business there, that state's law governs with respect to that
particular defendant. Plaintiffs are treated as sharing a common habitual residence or principal place
of business if they are located in states whose laws do not conflict materially. Id. § 6.01(c)(2).
Third, if the second preference does not apply, but al of the plaintiffs habitually reside or have their
principal places of business in the same state, and that state is also the place of the injury, its law
governs. Id. § 6.01(c)(3). Fourth, in all other cases, the governing law is of the state where the
conduct causing the injury occurred. When conduct has occurred in more than one state, the law of
the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence applies. Id. § 6.01(c)(4).
6. Id. § 6.01(d). (e). Under § 6.01(d), a court, "when appropriate," may depart from the order
of preference or apply "additional factors that reflect the regulatory policies and legitimate interests
of a particular state not otherwise identified" by preliminary analysis. The single amendment to §
6.01 that emerged at the ALI's concluding deliberations on the text was to change the prefatory
wording from "when necessary" to "when appropriate." 15 ALl Reporter, Summer 1993, at 9.
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Sections 6.04 and 6.05 provide that the law selected under Section 6.01
governs issues involving, respectively, statutes of limitations and monetary relief
generally. Section 6.06 provides special rules to govern the award of punitive
damages.8
Although these rules are complicated, they provide for clear choices among
connecting factors, in order of preference by a court. This prioritization of
connecting factors is a welcome departure from the customary (and often inept)
juggling of competing interests. The troublesome Hydra of "pure" government
interest analysis9 continues to menace mass tort cases. One explanation of the
durability of interest analysis is its notoriously tempting ambiguity and
manipulability. Courts can use it to justify almost any result they want;' 0
7. There are two exceptions to this rule. Under § 6.04 (Statutes of Limitations), "any claim
that was timely where filed but is not under the law chosen pursuant to this .section will be deemed
timely by the transferee court and remanded to the transferor court." Id. § 6.04. Under § 6.05
(Monetary Relief Generally):
(b) If the court determines that the monetary relief issues involve policies different from
those undirlying the liability issues and that the application of the law or laws [under
§ 6.011 to those issues would ignore the interests of states whose policies regarding the
measure of relief would be furthered by the application of their laws. it may sever the
relief issues for treatment under the laws of the states whose regulatory policies would be
furthered thereby.
Id. § 6.05.
8. The relevant contacts are the same as under § 6.01 except that the place of business or
habitual residence of a plaintiff or plaintiffs is not relevant. Id. § 6.06(b). Whenever the imposition
of punitive damages would further more ihan one state's policy, the court may award them
if the laws of the states where any two of the factors listed in subsection (b) are located
authorize their recovery and the court finds that the possible imposition of punitive
damages reasonably was foreseeable to the defendants. If multiple places of injury are
involved and they differ as to the availability of punitive damages, the law of the state
where the conduct causing the injury occurred governs. When conduct occurred in more
than one state, the court will choose the law of the conduct state that has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence.
Id. § 6.06(c).
If the court determines that punitive damages are authorized under subsection (c), but the
state laws identified in subsection (b) differ with respect to the standard or conduct giving
rise to the availability of punitive damages, the standard of proof required, the method of
calculation, limitations on the amount of punitive damages, or other matters, the order of
preference for the governing law on those issues, among the states authorizing punitive
damages, is the place of conduct, the primary place of business or habitual residence of
the defendant, and the place of injury.
Id. § 6.06(d).
9. The prototype of "pure" interest analysis was set forth by Brainerd Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1242-1243 (1963); see also Brainerd Currie, Selected
Essays on the Conflict of Laws 183 (1963). Another, more complicated version of interest analysis
is enshrined within the matrix of considerations in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws
§ 6 (1971). The "better rule" approach also incorporates interest analysis. See Robert A. Leflar,
Conflicts of Law: More On Choice-hifluencing Considerations, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1584, 1586-87
(1966).
10. A vast amount of literature illuminates this problem. For a close look at the problem in
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objective analysis, like the three-headed Hydra, thus becomes the stuff of
mythology. Although Section 6.01 may not be the Hercules to slay this Hydra,
it can help tame the beast in consolidated litigation and perhaps temper the
confusion in other fields of mass tort litigation as well. Section 6.01 is likely
to promote somewhat greater predictability, uniformity, and ease of judicial
administration, and to deter forum-shopping. These attributes ought to impress
Congress in its consideration of the ALI Project. Even if Congress fails to adopt
Section 6.01 or a similar federal choice-of-law scheme, however, t*he courts may
at least want to adopt or adapt its prioritization of connecting factors.
The attractiveness of Section 6.01 to Congress or the courts may depend in
part on its general conformity with common-law precedent. Of course, a close
conformity would be surprising. After all, the ALI Project responds to
dissatisfaction about the perceived chaos of the common law in consolidated
mass tort cases. Nevertheless, a general conformity between the ALl rules and
the common law is essential. Although the ALl sought to break new ground, it
did not intend to displace the common law entirely. The ALI Project's Reporters
evidently understood that modern choice-of-law thinking rests on the hope, if not
the promise, of development on the palimpsest of judicial analysis."' Reformu-
lation of new rules is to be based on observations of the way courts actually
decide cases. Although this expectation has not materialized after forty years of
judicial decisions inscribed on an invitingly clean slate-unless a lex fori
presumption is the new "rule"-the common law nevertheless remains a
foundation for any responsible regime of choice-of-law rules.
The ALl Project deserves great credit for citing and clearly summarizing
leading scholarship about choice of law in mass tort cases. It is striking,
however, that the cited literature and the Project itself seldom stray beyond a
select few cases.' 2 There are apparently no comprehensive digests of the case
law with which Sections 6.01-.07 can be reliably compared, analyzed, and tested
against in the courts. 13
To help fill this gap, the Appendix to this study provides outlines of 62
judicial decisions in air-disaster cases. These include not only consolidated cases
two jurisdictions, see James A. R. Nafziger. Conflict of Laws: A Northwest Perspective 136, 144-48,
184-87 (1985) (2d ed. forthcoming).
11. See, e.g., Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942).
12. A particularly useful summary of three of these cases, however. may be found in Andreas
Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, Slate, and International Perspectives 456 (1986).
13. Recently, however, the American Journal of Comparative Law has published excellent
annual summaries of conflict-of-lawsjrisprudence. These do highlight salient mass tort cases. The
summaries include Michael E. Soliminc, Choice of Low in the American Courts in 1991,.40 Am. J.
Comp. L. 951 (1992); Larry Kramer, Choice of LAw in the Anerican Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 465 (1991); P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice
of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 601 (1990); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 457 (1989); P.
John Kozyris. Choice of Law in tIhe Anterican Courts in 1987: An Overview, 36 Am. J. Comp. L.
547 (1988).
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in federal courts, but federal diversity cases, federal statutory and Warsaw
Convention 4 cases, and state court cases. Although federal consolidated cases
are clearly the most relevant, decisions in other types of cases are instructive.
They help clarify the common law in air-disaster cases, add perspective to the
rate of conformity between the common law and probable results in consolidated
cases under the ALl Project rules, and indicate the feasibility of adopting the
rules for application in non-consolidated cases.
The judicial decisions also constitute a data base for further analysis of mass
tort litigation and reformulation of rules. More stable rules need to be devised
for both interested and disinterested fora without regard to the procedural posture
of particular cases.
This article will now turn to the characteristic choice-of-law issues and
problems in air disaster litigation, particularly in consolidated cases.'3  A
summary of proposals for reform, including the new ALl rules, follows. The
article concludes with a comparison between the decisions in the 62 cases
outlined in the Appendix and the probable decisions under Sections 6.01-6.07 of
the ALl Project.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICTS PROBLEMS
A. Choice-of-Law Complexity
Claims arising out of air disasters involve a variety of issues that may
require adjudication. The most common issues are liability, survivability of
actions after the death of a tortfeasor or victim, compensatory damages for
injury, loss of life or loss of property, damages for pain and suffering, and
punitive damages.
In simple litigation, choice-of-law issues are routinely resolved according to
a single approach or set of rules. For example, in a personal injury or wrongful
death claim arising out of an automobile accident in one state brought by a
citizen of another state, a single, applicable methodology is usually clear
14. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, contcluded October 12. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. II [hereinafter the Warsaw
Conventionl. Significant litigation resulted from the Korean air disaster of 1983. All passengers and
crew of a jumbo jet perished when Soviet missiles shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007. which
had apparently strayed into Soviet airspace. As is now clear, the tragedy represented a nadir in Cold
War relationships. The Korean Air Lines tragedy also stimulated efforts to reform methods for
adjudicating mass disaster claims when it became apparent that like many other air disasters, most
of them accidental, the incident would generate a wave of complicated litigation. On the public
international law issLes, see Legitimne Respoisses to Aerial Intrusion in Timae of Peace, 1984 Proc.
Am. Soc. Int'l L. 15 (1986). For a summary of the United States' response, see, e.g., Marian N.
Leich, Destruction of Korean Airliner: Action by Ihtenarional Organizations, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 244
(1984); hItermational Claims: Destruction of Strayed Civilian Airliner. 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 213 (1984)
(official United States action in the matter).
15. See also Essays in Honor of Doo Hwan Kim 52 (1993).
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although its application may not be so clear. On the other hand, air disaster or
other mass accident or mass tort cases 6 often involve a confusing myriad of
methodologies because of consolidated claims initially filed in multiple courts by
multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants from multiple jurisdictions. This is
the essence of complex litigation. For example, in one federal action arising out
of a Michigan crash of a commercial airliner that had been designed and
manufactured in California, 7 the court consolidated 157 different cases on
behalf of passengers, flight attendants, and innocent bystanders who died or were
injured. The consolidation merged cases from many different federal jurisdic-
tions, thereby raising the additional issue of whether the appropriate law was to
be chosen according to the rules of the transferor courts or of the transferee
courts. Because the stakes of litigation are usually high in mass tort litigation,
the expenditure of party and judicial resources is apt to be astronomical, the
litigation as prolific as it is complex, and the judicial analysis highly complicat-
ed. All of these characteristics inhere in major air disaster claims 8
Complex cases thus raise difficult choice-of-law issues.' 9 These issues may
be even more complicated in air disaster cases than in products liability,
16. As used in this study. the term "mass ton" is one in which "many victims ... are injured
by the same wrongful conduct." Russell J. Weintraub. Methods for Resolving Conflict.of-Laws
Problems i, Mass Tort Litigatiott. 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129. Sometimes, however: the term "mass
ton" is defined by reference to "multiple occurrences of various related harms over time," whereas
a "mass accident" refers to "situations in which a number of persons are simultaneously harmed by
a single act of the defendant." Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A
Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1039. 1044 n.19 (1986); Briggs L. Tobin.
Comment. The "Limited Ge,,erosity" Class Action atd A tiform Choice of Law Rule: Anl
Approach to Fair attd Effective Mass.Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38
Emory L.J. 457 n.I (1989).
17. In re Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.
Mich., S.D. 1989).
18. Large-scale, complex litigation invariably results from a commercial air crash. Modern
commercial aircraft carry hundreds of individuals, and each person on board represents a
potential plaintiff if an accident occurs. Moreover, an aviation disaster commonly involves
numerous defendants. Plaintiffs almost always name the airline as a defendant, citing pilot
error or faulty maintenance, and plaintiffs typically sue the plane's manufacturer regarding
the aircraft's design. These two defendants, in turn, frequently join the manufacturers of
myriad component parts, such as altimeters, warning devices, landing gear, or engine bolts.
any of which might contribute to a particular crash. Other potential defendants include
airports and the United States government.
The mnultiple parties and multiple actions which usually accompany air disasters produce
massive litigation efforts in numerous federal and state courts. Individual plaintiffs, for
example, may file separate actions arising from the same crash in several federal districts
simply to obtain personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Defendants complicate the
process by cross-claiming among each other. This multiple district litigation often results
in uncoordinated pretrial and trial proceedings concerning a single air crash.
John H. Cowrie. Note, Air Crash Litigatiot and 28 U.S.C. Sectio, 1407: Experience Suggests a
Solntion. 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 927, 927-28 (footnotes omitted).
19. Larry Kramer, Choice of La4w it the American Courts in 1990: Trends ad Developments.
39 Am. J. Comp. L. 465. 472 (1991).
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employer liability, and other mass tort cases. This complexity is a result of the
mobility of aircraft and the relatively large number of prospective defendants in
multiple jurisdictions who are directly associated with the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and component parts.
Unfortunately, the rules for resolving such issues are inadequate, often
because they were designed for simple, two-party litigation.20 It is small
wonder that the choice-of-law process in air disaster cases "is a veritable jungle,
which, if the law can be found out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but a reign of
chaos dominated in each case by the judge's 'informed guess' as to what some
other state than the one in which he sits would hold its law to be."2'
To be sure, the menu of choice-of-law techniques is generally quite precise.
For example, a court may apply the laws of different jurisdictions to different
plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, or to different issues in a single case
(ddpeqage). Alternatively, a court may fashion its own multi-jurisdictional rules.
In international cases, a court may variously apply the Warsaw Convention and
other treaty law, international law principles and custom, and preemptive federal
law.
Although the menu of techniques may be clear, the methods for selecting
among them and applying them consistently in complex litigation are anything
but clear. One United States district judge recently complained that "[t]he choice
of law problems inherent in air crash and mass disaster litigation cry out for
resolution.""2
B. Multi-Jurisdictional Complexity
Another problem is multi-jurisdictional complexity. Choice-of-law issues are
complicated enough in a single jurisdiction, but the multiplicity of jurisdictions
nation-wide generates an extraordinarily complicated pattern of decisions. Within
the federal system, any of the more than 50 bodies of choice-of-law rules and
procedures may apply. The jurisdictional differentiation and the sheer volume
of cases ensure an ever-changing kaleidoscope of case law. 3 Of the more than
20. "Choice of law rules have been designed and developed with the two-party case in mind,
where the relevant contacts or interests at stake between the panies and the statutes in conflict are
more easily ascertainable and not so difficult in application." In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.P.R. 1990).
21. hi re Paris Air Crash of March 3. 1974, 399 F. Stipp. 732. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
22. h re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport. 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (D. Colo. 1988)
(Finesilver. J.).
23. For example,
[tihe kinds of choices that now exist (and the problem presented) can be understood best
by an example, which illustrates the lack of predictability under the current regime. After
an aircrash at Chicago's O'Hare Airport in the late 1970s, one hundred eighteen wrongful
death actions were filed in Illinois. California, New York, Michigan, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico. The decedents and plaintiffs in those cases hailed from California, Connecticut,
Hawaii. Illinois, Indiana. Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Vermont.
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1,200 conflict-of-laws cases decided in just one year,24 federal courts alone
must handle several hundred air disaster cases.' Fortunately, the majority of
these cases involve relatively simple claims although they may arise out of
multiparty disasters, just as state cases typically involve simple claims arising out
of crashes of small airplanes. 6  A minority of cases, however, involve very
complex sets of claims.
C. General Rules of Common Law
This article will focus primarily on federal jurisprudence because its
characteristic complexity raises the most serious choice-of-law issues. Federal
cases have prompted the proposed reforms discussed in Part 11 and are most
relevant to the ALl Project in particular.
I. Diversity Jurisdiction and Consolidation of Cases
Federal court jurisdiction over air disaster cases is sometimes based on
federal statutory law such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.27
Usually, however, jurisdiction is based on a diversity of domicile or residence
as between or among the parties to an action.
To avoid a proliferation of cases in different courts arising out of the same
incidents.and raising the same issues, the Multidistrict Consolidation Statute"
provides rules and procedures, relying on a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, for transferring such cases into a single federal court. Judicial
decisions have helped define the standards for transferring cases.29 The federal
Puerto Rico, Japan, The Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. Although several choice of law
issues surfaced, those surrounding the availability of punitive damages were most striking.
The district court analyzed the varying choice of law nles of California, New York,
Michigan, Missouri. Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Illinois and determined that all of the states,
for one reason or another, would allow punitive damages to be sought against the aircraft
manufacturer, which was a domiciliary of Missouri. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reanalyzed the same issue and reversed the lower court's conclusion in
every single instance. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied. 454 U.S. 878. 102 S. C. 358 (1981).
Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 6. Intro. Note. cmt. a, at 377.
24. Symeonides, supra note 13, at 457.
25. Kozyris & Symeonides. supra note 13. at 609.
26. Id. at 612.
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330. 1602-11 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
29. Convenience plays a dominant role in a transfer decision. More broadly:
The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to consolidate actions. ...
As federal court dockets burgeon, interests of judicial economy and efficiency gain
importance. Nevertheless. considerations of convenience must yield when consolidation
threatens to deny litigants a fair trial. ...
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consolidation statute lacks a choice-of-law provision, however. Instead, two
rules fashioned by the United States Supreme Court govern the choice of law.
The Klaxon rule establishes that a federal court hearing a case based on
diversity jurisdiction will apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the
federal court is sitting." Thus, a federal court in Los Angeles would apply
California's choice-of-law rules, which, of course, may differ from those of other
states. Often, however, it is difficult for a federal court to identify the relevant
state rules because they are largely uncodified, they are still evolving in some
states, and state courts or legislatures may have been silent, ambiguous or even
contradictory in addressing choice-of-law issues. When the courts have spoken,
they have often articulated rather elaborate analytic schemes or approaches such
as that of the Restatement (Second).' Such approaches often burden federal
courts in their valiant efforts to identify and apply state rules with integrity and
clarity. Federal courts may certify questions to state courts about their rules, but
the certification procedure is cumbersome and has been underutilized. 2
Mistakes, inconsistencies and confusion therefore abound.
The Van Dusen rule provides that when a case is transferred from one
federal court to another, as will occur when a complex case is consolidated in a
single court, choice-of-law rules of the transferor (original) court continue to
apply after the transfer.3 Coupled with the principle of ddpeqage, by which
laws of different jurisdictions may be applied to different issues and parties in
a single case, the Van Dusen rule can perplex courts 34 and produce odd or
discriminatory results. For example, when several similar actions are consolidat-
[Clriteria that the [triall court must consider in making determinations concerning
consolidation [includel:
IW]hether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion larc] overborne by the
risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the burden on
parties, witnesses, and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length
of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the relative
expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives.
In re E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.. 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.&S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted)
(quoting Johnson v. Seletex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281. 1285 (2d Cir. 1990)).
30. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487. 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
31. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1988).
32. John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins. literjutrisdictional Certification and Choice of Law. 41
Vand. L. Rev. 411. 458 (1988).
33. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612. 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964). The rule applies whether the
moving party for transfer is the plaintiff or defendant. Ferens v. John Deere Co.. 494 U.S. 516. 110
S. Ci. 1274 (1990).
34. In this type of litigation, the application of choice of law standards turns into a colossal
struggle for the transferee coun in attempting to ascertain relevant contacts between the
parties and the multiple states and in struggling to understand, evaluate and weigh the
particular policies behind the different statutes allowing or disallowing claims and/or
remedies.
hI re San Juan Du Pont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.P.R. 1990).
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ed in the same court, different laws may apply to plaintiffs who are domiciled
in the same state but have filed claims in different states.
2. Doctrinal Uncertainty
The variety, ambiguity, and instability of the rules and principles that
underlie modern choice-of-law processes in the United States pose particular
problems in air disaster cases. When a consolidation court is called upon to
apply the choice-of-law rules or approaches of several different jurisdictions, the
task is daunting. For example, in the Boston air disaster case 35 the court
applied five choice-of-law theories-lex loci delicti, lex domicilii, a public policy
exception to normal rules for recognizing foreign law, the Restatement (Second),
and choice-influencing considerations (the "better rule" approach).36 It is small
wonder that one federal court, for example, simply collapsed one theory into
another, claiming that one was "a more formalized version" 37 of the other.
Even when only one choice-of-law approach applies in a case, it may not
provide the necessary measure of predictability, uniformity, and ease of
administration in a complicated, high-stake aviation case." Consequently, the
principal Reporter for the Restatement (Second) himself noted the undesirability
of trying to apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship,
which is the core concept in the Restatement (Second).39 Another scholar has
highlighted the uncertain scope of the "unless clause" in the rule that the lex loci
delicti applies unless another state has a more significant relationship to the
occurrence or the parties.°
Policy analysis of even simple rules may be questionable. For example, the
rule or presumption of lex loci delicti is routinely discredited in air disaster cases
because of the "fortuity" of accidents. In reality, the place of an air accident is
usually not fortuitous: most accidents occur as a plane is either taking off or
35. In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston. Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Stpp. 1106 (D.
Mass. 1975).
36. Lowenfeld. supra note 12. at 457. Professor Lowenfeld's summary and brief analysis of
three air disaster cases highlights the complexity and uncertainty that beset choice-of-law analysis
in these cases. Id. at 456.
37. hi re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 (D. Colo. 1988)
(equation of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws approach with government interest
analysis).
38. For an excellent exposition of this problem, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and
the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 105. 112 (1989).
39. If possible, it would be desirable to avoid such vague criteria as application of the law
of the state with the most significant relationship or of the state which has the greatest
interest in the decision of the issue at hand or of the state whose interests would be most
impaired if its law were not applied. Formulations of this sort are hard for the courts to
apply and afford little predictability of result except in the clearest of cases.
Willis Reese. The Lou Governing Airplane Accidents. 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1303. 1304 (1982).
40. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Mass Torts and the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster,
1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1989).
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landing at an established place. Even mid-air disasters cause major impacts on
the financial resources and community of the jurisdiction directly below the
airspace of the disaster."'
In overcoming these deficiencies, fundamental policies of tort law, such as
deterrence, compensation and risk-spreading, are helpful, even necessary.42 But
reliance on such policies does not resolve specific issues of how much
deterrence, compensation or risk-spreading, when fundamental policies conflict.
For example, it would seem that the choice-of-law issues related to punitive
damages should be resolved by emphasizing the policy of deterrence and hence
applying the law of a defendant's allegedly outrageous conduct, as is emphasized
in the ALI Project. But alternative policies have been seductive. They have
teased out alternative rules such as the lexfori and the lex domicilii. A policy
underlying the choice of the lexfori has been the forum's interest in protecting
its integrity against inherently speculative awards, whereas a policy for tipping
the balance in favor of the plaintiff has been to give further effect to the
fundamental tort principle of compensation.43 Amidst such confusion about the
applicability of particular rules, a court can simply rule-shop for a suitable
rationale, choosing from among the many alternatives so as to "produce" a
predetermined result.
Ironically, modern approaches to choice of law are partly derived from
judicial opinions in several important air disaster cases of the 1960's, including
Van Dusen itself." Today, however, the case law is itself a disaster. Applica-
tions of these approaches in recent air disaster cases "seem to have made a
parody not only of the conflict of laws but of the law of torts in general."45
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Proposals for improving the legal regime in air disaster cases have followed
several tracks.
A. Federal Substantive Rules
The most ambitious proposals for reform urge the adoption of a comprehen-
sive federal code of aviation law to avoid, manage, and resolve disputes
uniformly throughout the United States.' The Warsaw Convention, which
41. Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the AU's
Proposed Choice Rule. 56 AIb. L. Rev. 807, 839 (1993).
42. Id. at 851.
43. Lee v. Ford Motor Co.. 457 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
44. Lowenfeld. supra note 40. at 157-58.
45. Id. at 158; accord Juenger. sutpra note 38.
46. JIlt is clearly in the interests of passengers, airline corporations, airplane manuracturers,
and state and federal governments, that airline ton liability be regulated by federal law.
Of course. we are well aware of the fact that it is up to Congress, and not the courts, to
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already. applies in a limited number of international disasters, provides one model
for such a code. An advantage of this model is that courts are familiar with the
treaty rules in international cases. Unfortunately, however, the antiquated rules
of the Convention and a "willful misconduct" exception, in particular, have
discouraged legislative imitation of the Warsaw Convention to govern domestic
cases.47  Other proposals for a comprehensive code of substantive law have
been futile in the face of Congressional indifference and threats to state authority.
Common-law models for nation-wide uniformity have also been controver-
sial. In the famous Agent Orange48 litigation, involving damage claims by
victims of herbicide spraying in the Vietnam War, a courageous federal judge,
relying on federal question jurisdiction, applied "federal common law." '49 On
remand later by an appellate court, the same judge applied a surrogate "national
consensus Law.' 'se Similarly, Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc."' held that
federal common law applied to issues of indemnity and contribution related to
an air disaster.5 2 Skepticism has, however, greeted both opinions."
Although there has been no real movement toward comprehensive
substantive reform, the need is obvious for making hard decisions rather than
simply delegating them to the courts or devising new rules of procedure." Half
a loaf of reform-better conflict-of-law rules-might be better than none at
all."
create the needed uniform law.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, 644 F.2d 594, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1981).
47. Weintraub, supra note 16, at 144.
48. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub not.
Chapman v. Dow, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S. Ct. 980 (1981); 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
49. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
50. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
51. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 421 U.S. 978. 95 s. Ct. 1980 (1975).
52. Id. at 403.
53. Weintraub, supra note 16. at 141.
54. We need, in short, to make some decisions. Once the competing values have been
sorted out, procedural devices such as consolidation, supervised discovery, lead and liaison
counsel, special masters, minitrials, and test cases can, help. None of these devices,
however, is a substitute for deciding whether fault must be proved, is to be presumed, or
is not decisive in determining compenrtion for accident victims. None of these devices
is a substitute for deciding how the value of a person's life is to be assessed, whether the
survivors' grief is to be compensated, and when, if at all, to assess punitive or exemplary
damages. None of these devices is a substitute for deciding how to deal with comparative
fault or responsibility, which in airplane disasters rarely involves the victims but
importantly affects the liability of the various actors whose errors together produced the
disaster.
Lowenfeld. supra note 40. at 171-72.
55. lilt is hard to quarrel with the assertion that a federal aviation accident act would be
the desirable solution. But such legislation, raising all the problems of accident compensa-
tion in the United States generally-fault or no-fault, compensation vs. punitive damages,
collateral benefits; pain and suffering, contingent fees and their regulation, etc.. etc.-has
proved impossible to adopt. A bill providing for federal choice of law rules, say limited
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B. Amendments to Current Rules
A more modest reform, then, would be to amend the threshold choice-of-law
rules. First, Klaxon's5 application of state rules in federal diversity cases
seems ill-equipped for cases whose complicated scope and multi-party character
engage the national interest.57 In complex litigation, at least, there is little
justification for applying state choice-of-law rules rather than a special multi-
jurisdictional or national rule that would take account of the broad, national
complexion of most air disaster claims and the national interest in their fair and
consistent disposition by the courts.
The American Bar Association (ABA) proposed federal legislation to
displace the Klaxon principle in mass tort cases. The ABA report aptly observed
that
separate adjudication of individual tort claims arising from a single
accident or use of o- exposure to the same product or substance is
inefficient and wasteful, seriously burdens both state and federal judicial
systems, poses unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results, and
contributes to public dissatisfaction with the tort law system and the
legal profession."8
Similarly, the Van Dusen rule is hard to justify in mass tort cases. While
responding to a classic threat of vertical (federal-state) forum-shopping, it utterly
ignores, or even encourages, the-serious threat of horizontal (state-state) forum-
shopping, especially in a plaintiff's crusade for punitive damages. 9  In
consolidated actions, Van Dusen60 may produce unjustifiable discrimination
among parties on the artificial basis of where their actions were originally filed.
A Congressional report concluded that "[w]hen Ihe purpose of the
jurisdiction is to use the Federal courts to do what no state court may be able to
do, it makes no sense to have a Federal court bound by the conflicts laws of a
single state."' Instead, the transferee court should be allowed to choose the
proper law without being bound "by the choice of law rules which the transferor
court ... would otherwise apply in cases governed by State law. 62
C. New Conflict-of-Laws Rules
A third path to reform involves the statutory creation of a single, stable
conflict-of-laws approach to govern mass accident/tort cases. Studies have
repeatedly revealed the impracticality of working within a jumbled framework
of open-textured, highly discretionary approaches. Ddpeqage in consolidated and
to muhti-party and multidistrict cases, might have a better chance.
Lowenfeld. supra note 12. at 460; see also Lowenfeld. supra note 40. at 171.
56. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.. 313 U.S. 487. 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
57. For a detailed description of the complexities, with a focus on a single case, see John
Austin, A General Framework for Analyzing Cthoice.of.Law Problems in Air Crash Litigation, 58 J.
Air L. & Comm. 909 (1993).
58. American Bar Association, Commission on Mass Tons, Report to the House of Delegates
(1989).
59. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. at 376.
60. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612. 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964).
61. House Comm. on the Judiciary. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. H.R. Rep.
No. 889. 100th Cong.. 2d Sess. 43 (1988). reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982. 6003.
62. H.R. 4807. 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., §§ 301-07 (1988).
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other complex cases is often cumbersome. Horizontal (state-state) forum-
shopping is a serious problem. In response, a consensus has emerged in favor
of applying the same body of rules to govern all issues in a single case. The
ALl Project is now the model. It prescribes rules of preference, to be applied
in the order in which they are listed, subject to exceptions in unusual cases.63
111. COMPARISON OF THE ALl SCHEME WITH JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The courts applied plaintiff-favorable law and the plaintiff won in the
majority of the sixty-two air-disaster cases outlined in the Appendix. This
tendency is consistent with the fundamental tort principle of compensation and
a plaintiff-preference that underlies modem thinking. When courts have adopted
modem approaches to choice of law that utilize interest analysis in some way,
there has been a somewhat surprising tendency to establish a true conflict and
then to balance interests to determine the applicable law. Thus, an important
contribution of interest analysis-its methodology for finding false conflicts, that
is, for avoiding conflicts--does not seem to have been as influential as one might
have expected. V
There appears to be a significant inconsistency between the judicial decisions
in consolidated cases of complex litigation and probable decisions under the ALl
scheme.6' Only 40% of the issues (n=20) would probably be decided the same
way. A partial explanation for this discrepancy is the relatively greater weight
that the ALI scheme puts on a combination of domicile and place of wrong.
Another explanation is the elimination of the lexfori as a choice-of-law rule or
presumption although it doubtlessly remains an influence. The best explanation,
though, is perhaps the most obvious: consolidated cases are so complicated as
things stand that they defy consistency and integrity to the point of randomness.
The courts need more guidance.
On the other hand, correlations between decisions on issues in the simpler,
non-consolidated cases and probable decisions on the same issues under the ALl
rules were much stronger. These correlations were as follows: issues in
diversity cases (n=20): 55%; issues in federal statutory cases (n=7): 71%; and
issues in state cases (n=24): 63%.65 Explanations for these correlations are
largely the obverse of the weak correlations in consolidated cases of complex
63. See supra notes 1-8.
64. The word -probable" is an important qualification. Numerous Uncertainties cloud the
comparison. These include the intricacy of the ALl Project's ries and hence difficulty of reliably
applying them, the absence or ambiguity of facts in the reported decisions that would be significant
to an ALl Project analysis, the uncertainty of whether a court would employ the prescribed safety
valves or other exceptions, and the problem of multiple places of injury-related conduct. It is also
unclear exactly when the laws of two or 'more states "conflict materially" (Proposed Final Draft,
supra note I, § 6.01(c)) for the purpose of determining whether the residences of "all" plaintiffs am
tantamount to being in the "same state." One problem that may be endemic to interest analysis is
determining the locus of tort-producing conduct. It is often difficult or impossible to pinpoint a
single locus. For example, either the principal place of business, where decisions arc made, or the
place of manufacture or assembly of a plane or its engine may be significant. The issue becomes
even more complicated when the most significant relationship test must be applied, namely, when
the connecting factor of conduct is determinative and conduct has occurred in more than one
jurisdiction. Whenever the principal place of business and place of wrong were known but the place
of conduct was not specifically identified as such, the author assumed, as a rule of thumb, that the
principal place of business was the primary place of conduct relevant to the occurrence of a mass ton.
65. Cases in which the Warsaw Convention preempts state law are not relevant in the ALl
scheme.
1994] 1013
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
litigation. In particular, the common law is more likely to influence the
resolution of choice-of-law issues in simpler litigation arising out of air disasters.
To the author's surprise, the common law reveals a generally careful and
accurate identification of state rules by federal courts. To be sure, the New
York-related cases exhibit that state's tradition of hopping from one choice-of-
law approach to another with the greatest of ease and the faintest of advance
notice. Decisions in air disaster cases thus confirm the uncertainty of the New
York choice-of-law process over the years. The courts also arrived at contending
interpretations of Michigan choice-of-law jurisprudence. With these exceptions,
however, the courts have been quite consistent in identifying particular state rules
and approaches, even when these have changed over time.
Applying the rules and approaches to the facts in individual cases is,
however, another matter. The flexibility of modern approaches underscores the
need for an omnibus rule or prioritization of rules to govern the choice of law
in complex litigation. The choice-of-law scheme in the ALl Complex Litigation
Project'is a step in the right direction. This first step may be somewhat wobbly,
however, because of exceptions for judicial discretion that encourage inconsistent
and pre-determined results. Nevertheless, the ALl scheme would help bring
some order and integrity out of the chaos that characterizes multi-party
adjudication of complex air disaster claims.
In the best of conflicts worlds, interest analysis would not exist. In
exercising the discretion inherent in any rule system, courts would be encouraged
to forthrightly reveal and defend the value premises and biases that understand-
ably and inevitably shape decision-making. The common law reveals a pattern
of plaintiff-preference in difficult cases, a vindication of the tort principle of
compensation, and a concern for applying the law, especially with respect to the
issue of punitive damages, that would best encourage high standards of design,
manufacture, and use of airplane equipment. This experience suggests the
advisability of highlighting these factors in a set of preference rules to guide
interest analysis more reliably and functionally.
The next step toward greater judicial consistency and predictability may be
for at least those courts applying some version of interest analysis to modify the
ALl rules of preference for application in non-consolidated cases. In taking this
step, courts would do well to minimize exceptions to the rules of preference.
They are the most troublesome feature of the proposed scheme.
Whatever the procedural posture of a case, and however neutral the forum
may be, judges should appreciate the need for a multi-jurisdictional perspective
that discourages horizontal forum-shopping and maximizes legitimate expecta-
tions of parties and systemic integrity. Choice-of-law rules in the ALI's
Complex Litigation Project are complicated and perhaps too flexible. They do,
however, point the way to a better regime. They actually look like rules. Even
if the ALl Project succeeds only as guidance for the courts, it can help rescue
them from choice-of-laws disasters and steer the law into the friendly skies of
stability and fairness.
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APPENDIX •
FEDERAL CONSOLIDATED CASES
(Selective coverage: 1975-1993, in reverse chronological order)
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.l
In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa,
on July 19, 1989,
734 F. Supp. 1425
(N.D.ll. 1990)
I. Site of Crash: Iowa
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from 30 states and two foreign
countries sued the following defendants:
a. United Airlines (United), a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Illinois. United maintained an aircraft
that crashed in California and had a crew
training center in Colorado;
b. McDonnell Douglas (MDC), a Maryland
corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Missouri. It designed and manufac-
tured the plane in California; and
c. General Electric (GE), a New York corp-
oration with its principal place of business in
New York and a plant in Ohio which manuf-
actured the engines on an ill-fated flight.
3. Issue:
What law should govern punitive damage
claims consolidated in a federal court after
transfer from other district courts?
Analysis
I. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen, the
court applied California, Colorado, Iowa, New
York, Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
District of Columbia choice-of-law rules.
2. Methodology:
a. California-transferred cases:
Comparative impairment analysis.
(I) As to United: Illinois, Colorado, and
California all had interests in controlling its
activities. The punitive damages laws of these
states present a true conflict. California does
not permit punitive damages in wrongful
death actions while it permits them in survival
and personal injury actions. Colorado does not
permit punitive damages in wrongful death or
survival actions. Illinois does not permit
punitive damages in wrongful death or
survival actions, but permits them in other
actions when a defendant has engaged in
gross negligence. The interests of Colorado
and California were limited to activities
within their respective territories. Illinois, as
the principal place of business, had an interest
in activity performed in all three states. There-
fore, the Illinois interest in providing for
punitive damages would be impaired more
than that of either Colorado or California if its
law were not applied.
(2) As to MDC: Missouri and California law
would be equally impaired if not applied.
Therefore, California law. as the law of the
transferor forum, would govern claims for
punitive damages because of California's
general preference to apply its own law when
it shares an equal interest in application of its
law with another state.
(3) As to GE: Ohio's interest would be more
impaired if its punitive damages policy were
not applied. Since the alleged wrongful acts
occurred in Ohio, its law ought to govern the
balancing of interests between deterrence and
protection of GE.
b. Colorado, Iowa, New York, Illinois and
Georgia-transferred cases: most significant
relationship test.
(I) As to United: The states whose law must
be considered are: Iowa, the place of the
injury; Colorado and California, the places of
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4. Decision:
a. Illinois law governed claims for punitive
damages against the airline.
b. California law governed claims for punitive
damages against the aircraft manufacturer.
c. Ohio law governed punitive damages
claims against the engine manufacturer.
5. Comparison with A.L. Ride (§ 6.06(b), (c),(d)):
a. As to United, probably a different result,
b. As to MDC, the same result.
c. As to GE, the same result.
the alleged misconduct; Illinois, the principal
place of business of United; and Delaware,
the place of incorporation of United. The
states ,of domicile of the plaintiffs were not
relevant. On balance, Illinois bore a more
significant relationship to the connecting
factors on the issue of punitive damages
because it benefitted from United's economic
activity there and ordinarily bore a substantial
risk that United's wrongful behavior would
result in an accident occurring on flights
scheduled to arrive in or depart from Chicago.
(2) As to MDC: The analysis was limited
to California, site of the alleged wrongful
conduct; Missouri, MDC's principal place of
business; Maryland, its place of incorporation;
and Iowa, the site of the injury. Since faulty
design and manufacture were the basis for the
punitive damages claims against MDC and
both occurred in California, California law
appropriately governed these actions.
(3) As to GE: GE manufactured and
designed the plane's engine in Ohio. Although
New York is GE's principal place of business,
its relationship to GE's aircraft engine
manufacturing business was less than Ohio's
relationship as the site of engine
manufacturer.
c. Pennsylvania and District of Columbia-
transferred cases: government interest
analysis and most significant relationship test.
Because both tests led to the same result in
an earlier analysis by the same court, the
choice-of-law rules of Pennsylvania and the
District of Columbia would result in
application of Illinois law to allow limited
.punitive damage claims against United,
California law to claims against MDC, and
Ohio law to claims against GE.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues & Decision
No.2
In re Air Crash at
Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16,
1987,
750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.Mich., S.D. 1989)
1. Site of Crash: Michigan
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from four states sued the
following defendants:
a. Northwest Airlines (Northwest), a
Minnesota corporation with its principal
place of business there; and
b. McDonnell Douglas (MDC). a Maryland
corporation, which had designed and
manufactured a plane in California, with its
principal place of business in Missouri,
3. Issue:
What law should govern compensatory
and punitive damage claims consolidated in
a federal court sitting in Michigan after
transfer from Arizona, California, and
Florida?
4. Decision:
a. California law applied to design defect
claims by all claimants;
b. Michigan's corporate protective law
applied to punitive damages claims against
both Northwest and MDC, other than those
filed in California, to which California law
applied.
Analysis
I. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen, the
court applied Michigan, Arizona, California,
and Florida choice-of-law rules.
2. Methodology:
a. Product liability claims against MDC:
(I) Cases originally filed in Michigan:
Rational reason test. Michigan's courts
consider whether there exists a "rational
reason" to displace the law of the forum in
favor of the law of another state in conflicts
analysis.
(a) States having contacts were Michigan,
Missouri. and California. The product liability
laws of these three states conflict. Michigan
rejects while Missouri adopts the doctrine of
strict liability in tort for product defects.
California refuses to follow the unreasonably
.dangerous requirement; instead, it allows
recovery on a strict liability theory as long as
the product was "defective."
(b) Michigan did not have a strong interest
in applying its producer-protective products
law to protect a foreign state producer that
supplied products for a company doing
business in Michigan. Both Missouri and
California had a strong interest in applying
their products liability laws. Thus, there was
a rational reason to displace Michigan law. As
between the laws of these two states,
California had the greater interest in applying
its own law since the alleged wrongful
conduct by MDC occurred within its borders.
(2) Arizona-transferred cases: Most signifi-
cant relationship analysis.
The states having contacts were Michigan,
California, Missouri, and Arizona. California
had a very strong interest in the application of
its producer-regulating products liability law.
An Arizona court would apply California law
to resolve the design defect issues.
(3) Florida and California-transferred cases:
Most significant relationship and comparative
impairment analyses.
California law governed.
b. Punitive damages claims against
Northwest and MDC:
(I) Cases originally filed in Michigan:
"Rational reason test:" '
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5. Comparison with A.LI. Ride (§ 6.01(b), (c),
§ 6.06(b). (c)):
a. As to MDC, the same result on product
liability claims, but partially different result on
punitive damage claims.
b. As to Northwest. a different result.
(a) Punitive damage claims against
Northwest: (i) The states having legally
significant contacts were Michigan and
Minnesota; (ii) Michigan disallows while
Minnesota allows the recovery of punitive
damages. Michigan had a very strong interest
in applying its law, which prohibits the
imposition of punitive damages on companies
doing business within its borders. Because
there was no rational reason to abandon
Michigan law, it should be applied.
(b) Punitive damage claims against MDC:
(i) The states with relevant contacts were
Michigan, California, and Missouri; (ii) Both
Michigan and California, unlike Missouri,
prohibit the imposition of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions. The application of the
punitive damages law of Michigan, as the
forum, would resolve a true conflict in which
Iwo involved states had an equal interest in
applying their punitive damages laws, and the
forum state had a strong interest in
implementing its own policy.
(2) Arizona and Florida-transferred cases:
most significant relationship analysis.
Because the conflicts analysis under
Arizona and Florida rules is essentially the
same as that of Michigan, Michigan law
applied to the punitive claims against both
Northwest and MDC.
(3) California-transferred cases: comparative
impairment analysis.
(a) Punitive damage claims against
Northwest: The states having legally
significant contacts were Michigan. California,
and Minnesota. There is a true conflict
between Michigan and Minnesota law because
Michigan disallows while Minnesota provides
for the recovery of punitive damages. The
court concluded that a California court would
apply Michigan law to resolve a true conflict
under the comparative impairment approach.
(b) Punitive damage claims against MDC:
The states with contacts were Michigan,
California, and Missouri. Both Michigan and
California preclude punitive damage awards in
wrongful death cases while Missouri permits
such awards. A true conflict exists between
the interests of California and Missouri. The
court concluded that a California court would
say that its own interest would be more
impaired by the application of another state's
law. Thus, California law governed punitive
damage claims against MDC.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.3
hi re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton hit'l
Airport. Denver, Colorado. on Nov. 15, 1987
720 F. Supp. 1445
(D.Co. 1988),
720 F. Stpp. 1467
(D.Co. 1989),
720 F. Supp. 1505
(D.Co. 1989),
rev'd in part and remanded,
sub, non. Johnson v. Continental Airlines,
964 F.2d 1059
(10th Cir. 1992)
I. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from Arizona. Colorado. Idaho.
New Jersey, and Washington stied the
following defendants:
a. Continental Airlines (Continental), a
Texas corporation with its principal place of
business in Texas; and
b. Texas Air Corporation (Texas Air), a
Texas corporation with its principal place of
business in Texas.
3. Issues:
a. What law should govern punitive damage
claims consolidated in a Colorado federal
court after transfer from Idaho, New Jersey
and Colorado federal courts?
b. What law should apply to-negligence
issues?
Analysis
I. Following Klaxon,and Van Dusen, the court
applied Idaho, Colorado. and New Jersey
choice-of-law rules.
2. Methodology: New Jersey applies govern-
ment interest analysis, whereas Idaho and
Colorado apply the most significant relation-
ship'analysis. Because the latter test is a more
elaborate version of the former, it would
subsume government interest analysis.
a. The punitive damage laws of Texas, Idaho.
and Colorado conflict. Idaho and Texas
provide for punitive damages in wrongful
death actions as well as contract and personal
injury cases while Colorado provides for
punitive damage awards only in personal
injury cases. Exemplary damages are
prohibited in actions for wrongful death or
breach of contract.
b. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
[hereinafter "Restatement Second"] two-step
choice-of-law analysis involves first, the
identification of the states having contacts
with the parties in the crash, and, second, a
determination of the relative significance of
these contacts.
(I) Colorado was the place of injury.
(2) The place of conduct: Since the plane
departed Texas. the conduct for which
Continental punitive damages may lie
occurred there primarily. Texas was also the
place of incorporation of both defendants.
(3) Principal places of business: To avoid
the application of Texas law, Continental
contended that it had more than one principal
place of business relevant to a choice-of-law
analysis. The court ruled that what mattered
was that Continental and Texas Air were
incorporated under Texas law and therefore
Texas was defendants' principal place of
business.
(4) Domicile and center of the parties'
relationships: Idaho was the residence of most
of the crash victims and the center of the
relationship between the passengers and the
carrier.
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c. What law should apply to issues of
compensatory damages?
d. What law should
prejudgment interest?
apply to issues
4. Decision:
a. Texas law applied
claims.
to punitive damage
b. By agreement among the parties, Colorado
law applied to issues of liability for
negligence.
c. By agreement among the parties, issues of
compensatory damages were to be resolved
under the law of each plaintiff's domicile,
which had the most significant interest in
placing a value on the injuries suffered.
d. Law governing compensatory damages also
governed prejudgment interest.
5. Comparison with AL. Rule (§§ 6.01(b),
(c), 6.05 and 6.06(b), (c)):
a. As to punitive damages, the same result.
b. As to negligence, a different result in the
absence of agreement among the parties.
c. As to compensatory damages, a different
result in the absence of agreement among the
parties.
d. As to prejudgment result, a different result.
c. Relevant contacts with this litigation were
with Colorado. Texas, and Idaho. Texas; as
the place of wrongful conduct and the
defendants' principal place of business had
the most significant relationship to the parties
and the occurrence in regard to the issue of
punitive damages for these reasons:
(I) In air crash cases, the interests of the
domicile of the plaintiffs and the center of the
relationship between the passengers and a
carrier is relatively low with regard to the
issue of punitive damages. Accordingly, the
relationship of Idaho to this litigation through
these two contacts did not surpass that of
Colorado.
(2) Colorado was less than a fortuitous place
of injury. Its interest in and ability to control
behavior by deterrence or punishment or" to
protect defendants from liability was.
however, less than that of Texas. The shared
goal of safe air travel was served by applying
the law of a home state to an airline.
Colorado's interest in air safety "was lessened
when a foreign corporation attempted to
shield itself from the more onerous laws of its
home state by seeking refuge under Colorado
law." 720 F. Supp. at 1453. Colorado's
decision to implement its economic interest
would not be frustrated by applying Texas
law.
d. Prejudgment interest.
The district court held that Colorado law
should govern an issue involving prejudgment
interest because the defendant bore the burden
of informing the coun, prior to the entry of
judgment in an exemplar trial, of showing that
Idaho law barred Idaho plaintiffs' claims for
prejudgment interest and the defendant had
waived any objection. The Tenth Circuit
reversed this decision for these reasons:
(I) Prejudgment interest is an element of
compensatory damages. The court was unable
to justify separating prejudgment interest from
the remaining elements of compensatory
damages.
(2) The Restatement Second classifies
prejudgment interest as an element of
damages for conflict-of-law purposes.
Logically, the same law should govern all
compensation-related issues.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.4
In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans,
Louisiana, on July 9, 1982.
789 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1986),
vacated other reasons,
490 U.S. 1032,
109 S. Ct. 1928 (1989)
1. Site of Crash: Louisiana.
2. Parties:
Uruguayan plaintiffs sued defendant, Pan
American World Airways, a New York
corporation with its principal place of
business there.
3. Issue:
Should Louisiana or Uruguay law apply to
wrongful death claims arising out of a crash
in Louisiana brought by Uruguayans that
were consolidated in a Louisiana federal
court?
4. Decision:
a. Louisiana law applied generally to
wrongful death recovery.
b. Uruguayan law applied specifically to
one plaintiff's claim for death of his aunt.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.01(b),
(c)):
A different result.
Analysis
I. Following the Klaxon rules, Louisiana
choice-of-law rules applied.
2. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
a. Prior to the enactment of a new code of
private international law, Louisiana courts
inquired whether there was a true conflict. If
so, the most significant relationship test was
applied.
b. Under the Restatement Second, the law of
Louisiana as the place of injury ordinarily
would apply absent a strong, countervailing
Uruguayan interest. Because the law of
Louisiana ordinarily would provide more
compensation than that of Uruguay, however,
Uruguay would have no interest in limiting an
award in favor of Uruguayan plaintiffs,
provided no Uruguayan defendant was
involved. The court reasoned that the needs of
the international system ordinarily would be
served best by applying Louisiana law.
c. But Louisiana law provided no remedy
for a nephew's injury arising out of the death
of his aunt in a crash. Therefore, with respect
to the nephew's claim, the law of Uruguay
applied.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.5
In re
Air Crash Disaster at
Mannheim, Germany, on September 11,
1982.
575 F. Supp. 521
(E.D.Penn. 1983).
rev'd on other ground,
769 F.2d 115
(3rd Cir. 1985)
cert. denied
474 U.S. 1082,
106 S. Ct. 851 (1986)
1. Site of Crash: Germany
2. Panies :
Plaintiffs from Germany, Great Britain,
France, and the United States, sued
defendant, Boeing, a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in
Washington and doing business in
California. Boeing designed and
manufactured a plane that crashed in
Pennsylvania.
3. Issue:
What law should govern liability and
damages issues in claims consolidated in a
federal court arising out of a crash in
Germany?
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.01(b),
The same result.
Analysis
I. Following Kaxon, Pennsylvania's choice-
of-law rule applied as follows:
2. Methodology: Pennsylvania uses a hybrid
conflict of laws approach, which combines
significant relationship approach with interest
analysis.
a. The jurisdictions to be considered on the
liability issue in the cases were Pennsylvania,
Germany, Great Britain, and France.
b. Pennsylvania had an interest in applying
its liability law against a resident
manufacturer acting within its home borders
because the "interests articulated by the
Pennsylvania courts in seeking to hold its
manufacturers as guarantors of their products'
safety would be furthered by application of its
own law." 575 F. Supp. at 525.
c. Regarding the laws of Germany, Great
Britain and France, the defendants argued that
all the foreign cases should be governed by
German law. The court ruled that the interest
that might be furthered by applying German
law was doubtful. If in limiting compensation
to injured parties, Germany was seeking to
protect. resident defendants from excessive
liability, the policy would not be furthered in
this situation since Boeing was not a German
resident. Therefore, these cases essentially
present a "false conflict" on the liability issue.
d. In those cases where Pennsylvania
compensatory damages law provides greater
protection than does the damages law of
another jurisdiction, Pennsylvania law would
be applied. "The Pennsylvania principle of
full compensation and placing (sic] the risk of
loss on its manufacturers would be furthered
by applying Pennsylvania liability law-to all
of the plaintiffs and applying Pennsylvania
damages law to the foreign plaintiffs." Id. at
526.
J
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.6
In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington,
D.C. on January 13, 1982,
559 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1983)
1. Site of Crash: District of Columbia
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from seven states and the
District of Columbia. sued the following
defendants:
a. Air Florida (AF), a Florida corporation
with its corporate headquarters in Florida
that operated the jet that crashed;
b. Boeing Company (Boeing), a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in
Washington (in those cases in which Boeing
was not named in the complaint, it was
impleaded by AF); and
c. American Airlines (AA), a Delaware
corporation that had recently moved its
principal place of business from New York
to Texas. AA is a defendant in some of the
cases because its employees at National Air-
port dc-iced an aircraft that crashed,
allegedly because of ice on its equipment.
3. Issues:
a. What law should govern negligence,
product liability, and punitive damage claims
in a federal court after transfer from other
district courts?
Analysis
I. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts. Pennsylvania. Texas, and
Virginia choice-of-law rules applied as
follows:
2. Methodology:
a. Illinois, Maryland, Texas, Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania-transferred cases and cases
originally filed in District of Columbia:
government interest analysis.
(i) Negligence: In the absence of conflict
among the negligence laws of the various
interested jurisdictions, the law of the forum
applied.
(2) Product liability claims against Boeing:
(a) The potentially interested jurisdictions
were Washington, the District of Columbia,
and Florida. As between the District of
Columbia and Florida, the former was a more
likely choice. The great majority of
passengers were from the District of
Columbia. and the municipality itself was a
plaintiff.
(b) The District of Columbia has adopted
the doctrine of strict liability in tort for
product defects whereas the state of
Washington has established a. negligence
standard.
(c) District of Columbia law should govern
because it had the most significant
relationship to this issue. The location of the
crash was not fortuitous because many of the
victims had some kind of settled relationship
in the District of Columbia. The District of
Columbia's interest in liability for
compensatory damages and punitive damages
vis-a-vis Washington (the state of
manufacture), was substantial. The Boeing
737 aircraft had been designed for operation
from an airport such as National Airport.
concerning which the District of Columbia
had a substantial interest. Although the state
of Washington had an interest in the design of
the aircraft, its interest was not greater than
that of the District of Columbia.
(3) Punitive damages:
(a) As to the punitive damage claims
against AF and AA: The states having some
contact with this litigation relevant to the
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b. What law should govern the apportionment
of liability or contribution?
4. Decision:
a. District of Columbia law governed all
issues with respect to cases filed in Virginia;
with respect to actions filed in other
jurisdictions, District of Columbia law
governed all issues except the apportionment
of liability or contribution.
b. Georgia law governed the apportionment of
liability or contribution with respect to actions
filed in Georgia.
c. Florida, Texas, and Washington law
governed the apportionment of liability or
contribution with respect to actions filed in all
other ju risdictions.
5. Comparison with A.Ll Rule (§ 6.05,
§ 6.06(b). (c)):
a. As to AF, different results.
b. As to AA, different results.
c. As to Boeing, different results.
punitive damages issue were the District of
Columbia and Virginia, principally, but also
Texas and Florida. Because AF and AA's
conduct occurred outside of Texas and
Florida, the corporate accountability interests
of Texas and Florida were lessened and the
most interested jurisdictions were the District
of Columbia and Virginia. As between the
District of Columbia and Virginia, the former
had the most significant relationship to this
issue because the injurious effects of the
conduct were predominantly felt in the
District of Columbia and victims were rushed
by rescue units stationed there to hospital and
other facilities within the District.
Accordingly, District of Columbia law, which
allows punitive damages in survival actions
but not wrongful death actions, would control
the question of the liability of AF and AA for
punitive damages.
(b) Punitive damage claims against
Boeing: The jurisdictions having contacts with
this issue were Washington state and the
District of Columbia. The District of
Columbia had the greater interest in the
question of Boeing's liability for punitive
damages. Accordingly, with respect to those
actions originally filed in a jurisdiction that
has adopted interest analysis, the law of the
District of Columbia would apply.
(4) Apportionment of liability:
(a) The District of Columbia and Virginia
both follow an equal-share rule, under which
all culpable defendants contribute equal parts
of the judgment, regardless of their relative
fault. All defendants, however, supported
application of a comparative fault rule under
the laws of other jurisdictions according to
which each tortfeasor is assessed a portion of
the judgment proportional to its relative
culpability.
(b) The court held the jurisdictions most
interested in the application of the
comparative fault rule were those in which the
defendants were located. Florida, Texas, and
Washington (the principal places of business
of Air Florida, American Airlines, and
Boeing, respectively) all follow the so-called
comparative fault rule. Therefore, the
comparative fault rule would govern the
apportionment of liability among the
defendants.
b. Virginia, Georgia, and Maryland-
transferred cases: Interest analysis would
direct that the law of the District of Columbia
[Vol. 541024
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should be applied to all issues except for the
apportionment of liability because the
defendant's domicile would be more
interested in how fault was apportioned.
(I) Virginia-transferred cases:
Under Virginia's lex loci delicti rule, the
law of the District of Columbia governed all
issues.
(2) Georgia-transferred cases:
Although it was not certain that the
Georgia Supreme Court would follow the
doctrine of lex loci delicti, it would be
inappropriate to rule that lex loci delicti was
no longer the rule in Georgia tort actions.
Precedent indicated that Georgia would not
enforce foreign statutory law in conflict with
its own public policy. Georgia has a
comparative fault rile for contribution among
tortfeasors.. The policy behind such a rule
includes the forum's interest in fair treatment
of all parties, contrary to the District of
Columbia's equal-share rile. Consequently,
while District of Columbia law would govern
all other issues, the Georgia rule of
apportionment by comparative fault would
govern the liability of the various defendants.
(3) Maryland-transferred cases:
Unlike Virginia and Georgia, Maryland
left the door open to adopting a modern
choice-of-law approach at an appropriate time.
Since the lex loci delicti rule apparently no
longer has vitality in Maryland, its courts
presumably would not apply it in this case.
Therefore, "the law ... shall be the same as
the relevant law governing those other actions
subject to the analysis [elsewhere in' the
opinioni." Id. at 362.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.7
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
Illinois on May 25, 1979
644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
cern denied, 454 U.S. 878,
102 S. Ct. 358 (1981)
1. Site of Crash: Illinois
2. Panics:
Plaintiffs from I 1 states and three foreign
countries sued the following defendants:
a. McDonnell Douglas (MDC), a Maryland
corporation with its principal place of
business in Missouri. MDC had designed
and manufactured in California a plane that
crashed in Illinois; and
b. American Airlines (AA). a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in New York and a maintenance
base in Oklahoma.
3. Issue:
What law should govern punitive damage
claims consolidated in a federal court sitting
in Illinois after transfer from six federal
courts?
4. Decision:
Because there was a true conflict between
the laws of states having equal interests, the
law of the place of the injury was applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.06(b).
(c)):
a. As to AA, a different result.
b. As to MDC. same result.
Analysis
1. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen. Illinois,
California, Michigan, New York. Puerto Rico.
and Hawaii choice-of-law rules should apply.
2. Methodology:
a. Illinois. the place of injury, California, the
place of MDC's alleged misconduct, and New
York. which was one of the principal places
of business of AA, did not allow punitive
damages, whereas all other states, including
Oklahoma, did.
b. Illinois-transferred cases: most significant
relationship test.
(I) It was unclear whether the relationship
of the parties was "centered" in Illinois, the
place of departure, or California. the place of
destination. The court found that the domicile
of the plaintiffs had no interest in disallowing
punitive damages because the underlying
policy is designed to protect the interest of
resident defendants. This determination left
for consideration the interest of the state
where the alleged misconduct occurred, the
state of the principal place of business, and
the state where the injury occurred.
(2) The court explained that states award
punitive damages to deter wrongful conduct
or disallow punitive damages to protect the
economic well.being of corporations in their
state. The court concluded that California, the
place of MDC's conduct in the manufacture
and design of the plane, and New York. AA's
principal place of business, had obvious
interests in protecting businesses within their
borders. The court also found that the states
allowing punitive damages had strong
interests in preventing future misconduct. The
court rejected MDC's argument that the slate
of a corporation's principal place of business
had no interest in punishing its own corporate
domiciliary. The court concluded that both the
state of the principal place of business and the
state of the defendants' misconduct had strong
interests in the issue of punitive damages, but
the court was unable to say which one had the
stronger interest of the two.
(3) As to MDC: Missouri had an interest in
allowing punitive damages in order to control
the conduct of its corporations. California had
an interest in protecting a domestic
corporation against excessive liability.
However. Illinois' interests were paramount to
those of Missouri and California because of
its interest in encouraging air transportation
companies to do business within Illinois by
limiting punitive damages. Other factors being
equal, the law of the place of injury should
apply.
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(4) As to AA: Oklahoma, the place of
conduct, and New York, the principal place of
business, each had strong interest in having its
law applied to the issue of punitive damages.
It was also very hard to conclude that one
state's interest was greater than the other.
Following the same analysis used above,
when the interests of the states of alleged
misconduct and principal place of business
were equal and in a true conflict, the law of
the place of injury (Illinois) would apply.
b. California-transferred cases: comparative
impairment approach.
(I) The court examined two factors to
determine the relative commitment of each
state to the law involved: "[a] the current
status of a statute and the intensity of interest
with which it was held; and [b] the
comparative pertinence of the statute: the 'fit'
between the purpose of the legislature and the
situation in the case at hand." 644 F.2d at
622.
(2) The court found that the states of
MDC's and AA's principal places of business
and of their alleged misconduct all had strong
current interests in their punitive damages
laws. and that there was a good "'fit" between
the purpose of each law and the facts of the
case. The court was unable to say "that either
state's interest would be impaired less by the
failure to apply its policy." Id. at 625. The
court resolved "a total and genuine conflict
between the laws of the principal place of
business and the place of the injury by turning
to the law of Illinois, the place of the injury."
Id. at 61. The justification for application of
Illinois law was that, although the interests of
Illinois were inferior to those of the other
states considered, Illinois was nevertheless
severely affected by this disaster and the
expenses incurred by it on account of the
crash; with respect to the actions filed in
Illinois, all but two of the decedents resided
there; and Illinois. as home of one of the
world's busiest airports, had a strong interest
in protecting airplane-related industries.
1994] 1027
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c. New York-transferred cases: most
significant relationship test.
Because the New York and Illinois tests
were the same, the conflicts analysis was also
the same. Thus, for the reasons discussed with
regard to Illinois law, the court granted the
motion to strike New York punitive damages
claims against both MDC and AA by
applying Illinois law.
d. Michigan.transferred cases: lex loci delicti
rule.
(I) Although it was clear that Michigan
courts had rejected automatic application of
the rule of lex loci delicti. it was not clear
what test had replaced it.
(2) The court concluded that the Michigan
court would apply the law of the place of
injury to this case since the place of conduct
and the principal place of business had equal
interests in applying their laws and because
Michigan had a long history of following the
lex loci delicti rule.
e. Puerto Rico-transferred cases: lex loci
delicti rule.
At the time of the litigation, Puerto Rico
applied the traditional lex loci delicti rule to
tort actions. Under this rule, Illinois law
applied.
f. Hawaii-transferred cases: The choice-of-
law rule was not determined.
(I) Where the choice of law could not be
determined. "absent an affirmative showing to
the contrary, the court should presume that
the forum would apply its own law." Id. at
631.
(2) Hawaii law, which does not authorize
punitive damages in wrongful death cases,
would meet the needs of the case and be in
the interest of justice because "the use of two
modern choice-of-law theories, as well as the
old rule of lex loci delicti, all lead to the same
result in this case." Id. at 632. The court
granted the motions to strike Hawaii punitive
damages claims against both defendants.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.8
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South
Vietnam, on April 4. 1975.
476 F. Supp. 521
(D.D.C. 1979)
1. Site of Crash: Vietnam
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs were Friends for All Children
(FFAC), a Colorado non-profit corporation
which acted on behalf of Vietnamese
orphans who had survived a crash and on
behalf of the estates of those who had been
killed by it; and United States citizens who
had survived the crash and representatives of
the estates of passengers who had not.
Defendants were Lockheed, a California
corporation. which had built a plane in
Georgia for the United States Air Force that
crashed, and the United States, which
Lockheed brought in as a third-party
defendant.
3. Issue:
What law should govern wrongful death
and survival actions arising out of an air
crash in Vietnam after transfer of cases from
different federal district courts?
4. Decision:
District of Columbia law applied.
Analysis
I. Because federal jurisdiction was based on
both a consolidated assignment of claims and
diversity under the Klaxon rule. the District of
Columbia's choice-of-law rules were
applicable.
2. Methodology: Government interest analysis.
a. Precedent offers only limited guidance for
interest analysis because the status of the
passengers and the carrier was sui generis. It
was a paramount interest and concern of the
United States federal government that its
courts provide a just and reasonable resolution
of claims such as those on behalf of the
estates of the deceased orphans.
b. District of Columbia rules on the survival
of actions were enacted by Congress. Because
of the consequent national interests at stake
here, the law of the forum should be displaced
only if some other jurisdiction has an
overwhelming policy interest in applying its
own law.
c. Those jurisdictions claimed by Lockheed
or FFAC to have a strong or equal interest so
as to be an appropriate source of law were:
Georgia, the site of the Lockheed plant which
built the ill-fated plane; Colorado, the place of
FFAC's incorporation and the source of its
letters of administration for the deceased
orphan's estates; Virginia, the headquarters of
the Department of Defense and Air Force;
Vietnam. the scene of the crash and the
original home of the orphans; and California,
the headquarters of Lockheed.
d. There was no legal or functional basis for
elevating the law and policy of any
jurisdiction relating to survival of actions
above the "national" law of the District of
Columbia.
(I) Neither Colorado. Georgia. nor Virginia
had any interest in providing compensation
for the decedents' estates since none of the
decedents resided in the United States at the
time of their deaths, nor were there any
medical creditors in those jurisdictions.
(2) Vietnam's interest, in contrast, might
weigh heavily if these decedents had not
crashed while in the process of evacuating the
country and if the South Vietnamese
government, which might have had an
interest, had not been conquered and
extinguished by the Hanoi government, which
apparently had no such interest.
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5. Comparison with ALL. Rule (§ 6.01(b),
(C)):
The same result (on the relatively unusual
basis in this kind of case that only one
jurisdiction had a policy that would be
furthered by the application of its law).
e. This was not to suggest that in any other
diversity case involving a substantial contact
in the District of Columbia. its law should
necessarily apply. These orphans were en
route to the United States when they were
killed and injured, and the United States was
impleaded as a party to the action. These
cases were filed in the District of Columbia,
and the multidistrict panel assigned all the
companion cases there. Most importantly, the
United States had a special role in the design
of the plane that crashed. Therefore, the law
of the forum, enacted by Congress. should not
be displaced.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston.
Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973,
399 F. Supp. 1106
(D. Mass. 1975)
I. Site of Crash: Massachusetts.
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from eight states sued defendant,
Delta Airlines, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Georgia.
3. Issue:
What law should govern the issue of
damages in a wrongful death action
consolidated in a federal court after transfer
from five federal courts?
4. Decision:
a. In the cases transferred from Vermont,
New Hampshire, and Florida. the law of
each transferor state applied, respectively.
b. In the cases transferred from New York,
the law of the domiciles of parties applied.
c. in the cases transferred from Mass-
achusetts, its limitation on damages applied.
5. Comparison with A.L.L Rule
(f 6.01(c)(4)):
A different result.
Analysis
I. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen,
Vermont. New Hampshire. Florida, New
York. and Massachusetts choice of law
applied as follows:
2. Methodology:
a. Vermont-transferred cases: Most
significant relationship analysis.
Although Vermont has never formally
abandoned the lex loci rule in torts cases, it
would do so in this case in view of both its
application of the Restatement Second to
contract cases and the trend elsewhere in the
law.
(I) Vermont and Massachusetts would be
the states whose law must be considered
under Vermont's presumed new approach.
(2) Massachusetts' sole contact with this
litigation was the fortuity of the accident
there. This contact alone was insufficient to
support application of its law to issues
involving non-resident parties.
(3) Vermont, which was the residence of
most plaintiffs and all of their decedents and
the place where the relationship between the
parties was centered, had the most significant
relationship to the occurrence with respect to
the issue of a wrongful death limitation.
b. New Hampshire-transferred cases:
Choice-influencing considerations (the so-
called "better rule" test).
(1) With one exception, plaintiffs were
residents of New Hampshire, as were all of
their decedents at the time of their death. All
of the plaintiffs' decedents bought their tickets
in New Hampshire and expected to return to
New Hampshire.
(2) Applying the better rule test to these
facts, the court concluded that New
Hampshire law should apply because:
(a) predictability of result is to be accorded
little weight in air disaster cases where the
"transaction" is unplanned-
19941
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(b) the substantiality of New Hampshire's
connection with the issue of damages
recoverable for the deaths of its own residents
was obvious;
(c) New Hampshire's interest lay in
imposing liability calculated to deter future
tortious conduct upon her residents;
(d) as between the Massachusetts and New
Hampshire statutes, the latter is a better rule
of law because it more closely conforms with
the policy of compensation which underlies
the theory of damages in all tort actions.
c. Massachusetts-transferred cases: Lex loci
delicti rule.
All substantive aspects of a cause of action
are governed by the law of the place where
the injury occurred. Therefore, these actions
for wrongful death were governed by the
Massachusetts law in effect at the time of the
crash, including its limitation on damages.
d. Florida-transferred cases:
Since Florida courts "have never adopted
the significant contacts test. nor do they now
deem it necessary to adopt or reject it." id. at
1116, the court had to determine the public
policy of each state with respect to a
limitation on damages recoverable for
wrongful death. The court concluded that the
Florida Supreme Court. as a matter of its
public policy, would refuse to grant comity to
the Massachusetts damages limitation and
would apply the unlimited damages provision
of the Florida death statute to these actions.
Florida's connection with this case was
substantial enough to support application of
its own law.
e. New York-transferred cases:
Although neither state nor federal courts in
New York would have heard the cases, the
court nevertheless applied New York choice-
of-law rules. Under these rules, the law
applicable to the theory and amount of
damages recoverable for wrongful death is
that of the domiciles of the decedents and
their beneficiaries. The wrongful death
statutes of Connecticut. Maryland. and
Vermont, which were the domiciles of
decedents and their surviving spouses and
children, do not limit damages under the
circumstances.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.10
In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,
399 F. Supp. 732
(C.D. Ca. 1975)
1. Site of Crash: France
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from 24 foreign countries and 12
states of U.S. sued the following defendants:
a. McDonnell Douglas, a Maryland
corporation with its principal place of
business in Missouri. which designed, tested,
and manufactured the plane in California.
b. General Dynamics, a California
corporation which was the subcontractor for
the fuselage and doors of a plane that
crashed;
c. Turkish Airlines. Inc.. a Turkish
corporation with its headquarters there; and
d. the United States.
3. Issue:
What law should govern the issue of
damages in products liability claims arising
out of a crash in France that were
consolidated in a California federal court?
4. Decision:
California law applied.
Analysis
I. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments
that damages should be awarded according to
the laws of the countries where the victims
lived at the time of the crash, noting that to
do so would deny defendants the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The court decided from the
bench in the early stages of the proceedings.
without written opinion, that the law of
California and the United States statutes and
regulations applicable to these cases would
govern issues of product liability and
negligence as well as all other grounds for
liability, and that a decision on the choice of
law to govern damages would be deferred to
a later date.
2. The parties cited no standard or rules for
choice of law on damages under "any of the
foreign legal systems" (presumably with
particular reference to Turkey. as the state of
incorporation and headquarters of the
defendant airlines).
3. Following Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen.
California choice-of-law rules applied.
4. Methodology: Government interest
approach.
a. Governmental interest sufficient to justify
application of California law exists when the
act or omission which ultimately caused the
accident occurred in California. There are
three distinct aspects of a cause of action for
wrongful death. The first aspect, insofar as
plaintiffs are concerned, reflects the state'sI interest in providing for compensation and in
[ determining the distribution of the proceeds.
an interest extending only to local decedents
and local beneficiaries; the second, insofar as
defendants are concerned, reflects the state's
interest in deterring conduct, an interest
extending to all persons present within its
borders; and the third, insofar as defendants
are concerned, reflects the state's interest in
protecting resident defendants from excessive
financial burdens.
b. All three issues compel application of the
California law of damages. California is
interested mainly in:
(I) deterring tortious conduct of California
defendants present in this case:
10331994]
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5. Comparison with ALI. Rule (0 6.01(b). (2) avoiding the imposition of excessive
(c)): financial burdens on these resident defendants.
and
The same result.
(3) providing a uniform rule of damages so
that those who come under the ambit of
California's strict product liability law and
market their product outside of California or
in foreign countries may know what risks they
are subject to when they make and sell their
products. Under its precedent, California
courts would not apply foreign standards
which limit recovery and would hold that the
foreign jurisdiction has no interest in so
holding because the latter has no California
resident defendant to protect.
5. California law does not materially differ
from that of other implicated jurisdictions and
can be liberalized adequately to take account
of a United States interest in regulating civil
aviation.
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FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASES
(Selective coverage: 1975-1993, in reverse chronological order)
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.1I1
Western Helicopter. Inc.,
Rogerson Aircraft Corp..
728 F. Supp. 1506
(D. Or. 1990)
1. Site of Crash: Oregon
2. Parties:
Oregon plaintiffs sued several defendants
allegedly responsible for the safety of main
rotor blade forks in a helicopter that crashed.
Most of the defendants were domiciled in
California. except for a Washington and a
Nevada corporation.
3. Issue:
What law should govern a wrongful death
action in an Oregon federal court arising out
of a crash in Oregon when all the
defendants were non-residents?
4. Decision:
Oregon law applied.
5. Comparison with'A.LI. Rule(§ 6,01(c)(3)):
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Under the Klaxon rule, Oregon choice-of-
law rules applied. Accordingly, a court must
first determine whether a true conflict of law
exists. If so. the Restatement Second test
applies.
b. Oregon's successor-liability law conflicts
with those of California and Washington
because Oregon does not adopt a product-line
exception.
c. Relevant contacts in Oregon included the
place of injury, residence of the decedent and
decedent's representative, and place of
ownership and maintenance of the helicopter.
Relevant California contacts included the
place of helicopter manufacture and places of
incorporation of most defendants. Relevant
Washington and. Nevada contacts were the
places of incorporation of the defendants.
d. In wrongful death cases the most
significant contact is with the place of injury,
especially where the decedent has a settled
relationship to that state. Because the
helicopter was owned and operated by an
Oregon resident, the place of injury was not
fortuitous, and Oregon law therefore applied.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
No.12
Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
Morgan
v.
United Air Lines. Inc.,
750 F. Supp. 1046
(D. Colo. 1990)
1. Site of Accident: Hawaii
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Colorado, sued
defendant United Airlines, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois. Plaintiffs sought
recovery for emotional distress resulting
from decompression of airplane when a
cargo door separated from the fuselage.
3. Issues:
a. Should federal common law or Colorado
law govern the choice of law in an action
based on federal diversity jurisdiction?
b. Does Hawaii or Colorado law govern an
emotional and mental distress claim under
the Warsaw Convention?
4. Decision:
Colorado choice-of-law rules and
substantive law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. The court held that federal common law
did not apply because under the Warsaw
Convention it did not preempt state law unless
the latter conflicted with the Convention. It a
federal diversity action, Colorado's choice-of-
law rules applied.
b. Using a Restatement Second analysis, al-
though the accident occurred in Hawaii,
Colorado bore the most significant
relationship to the litigation since the
plaintiffs were domiciliaries of Colorado, the
parties' b~siness relationship occurred in
Colorado. and the defendant had a place of
business there.
Probably a different result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.13
Lewis-DeBoer
V.
Mooney Aircraft Corp.,
728 F. S6pp. 642
(D. Colo. 1990)
1. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parties:
Colorado plaintiffs sued defendant, a New
Jersey corporation with its principal place of
business in Texas. It designed,
manufactured, promoted, and sold a plane
that crashed in Colorado.
3. Issue:
What law should apply in a products
liability action alleging that a defective
cargo door latch caused an aircraft crash in
Colorado?
4. Decision:
Texas law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule
(§ 6.01(c)t3)):
A different result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Under the Klaxon rule. Colorado choice-
of-law rules applied.
b. Using a Restatement Second analysis, the
court found that Texas bore the most
significant relationship to the litigation and
the parties for these reasons:
(1) Place of injury: That the air crash and
resulting injuries occurred in Colorado was
fortuitous and therefore warranted little
weight.
(2) Place of injuring conduct: The alleged
tort occurred in Texas.
(3) Domicile, residence, and place of
business of the parties: The defendant
designed, manufactured, and sold its products
in Texas. The importance of defendant's place
of business was heightened because this was
a product liability case.
(4) Policy. consideration: The defendant
had no significant links to Colorado and could
therefore not claim the benefit of Colorado's
policy, which limits wrongful death recovery.
Application of Texas policy to deter harmful
conduct there was appropriate where
defendant had close ties to Texas.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.14
DeGrasse v. Sensenich Co.,
CIV.A.No. 88-1490,
1989 WL 23775 (E.D. Pa.)
1. Site of Crash: Unidentified.
2. Parties:
Arkansas plaintiffs sued defendant, a
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
place of business in Pennsylvania. It
manufactured and supplied an allegedly
defective propeller which was installed on a
plane that crashed.
3. Issue:
Should Arkansas or Pennsylvania law apply
to the issues of liability and damages in a
wrongful death action instituted in a federal
court sitting in Pennsylvania arising out of an
air crash in an unidentified location?
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: "Pennsylvania's flexible
choice-of-law test." Id. at *3.
2. Rationale:
a. Under the Klaxon rules, Pennsylvania
choice-of-law rules would apply.
b. Pennsylvania has abandoned the lex loci
delicti rule in favor of a "more flexible rule
which permits analysis of the policies and
interests underlying the particular issue before
the court." Id.
c. The policies of Arkansas and Pennsylvania
and the contacts of the two states with the
controversy were dispositive.
(I) Arkansas can be characterized as a
defendant-protecting state in products liability
cases. That policy would be irrelevant in a
case between Arkansas plaintiffs and non-
Arkansas defendants.
(2) Pennsylvania can be characterized as a
plaintiff-protecting state and its policy is to
deter the manufacture of defective products by
assigning responsibility for such an activity to
Pennsylvania manufacturers. Pennsylvania
would thus be a concerned jurisdiction
because the defendant, which manufactured
the ill-fated plane, was incorporated and had
its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania. On the other hand, it would be
fair to the defendant to apply the law *of its
home state to the issues of damages and
liability.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.15
Damin Aviation Corp.
Sikorsky Aircraft.
705 F. Supp. 170
(S.D.N.Y.),
a.Td 880 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1989)
i. Site of Crash: New Jersey
2. Parties:
Plais itffn a New Jersey corporation with its
principal place of business in New Jersey.
sued defendants, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Connecticut
and another Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Michigan.
3. Issues:
What law should govern a lessee's tort (and
contract) claims instituted in a federal court in
New York arising out of a New Jersey air
crash?
4. Decision:
a. New Jersey law governed the lessee's tonrt
claims.
Sb. Connecticut law governed the contract
claims.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (f 6.01(c)(3)):
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: New York's "substantial
interest" test.
2. Rationale:
a. Because jurisdiction was based on
diversity, New York choice-of-law rules
applied following the Klaxon rule.
b. New York applies the "substantial interest"
test to tort choice-of-law issues. In applying
this test, controlling effect is given to the law
of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship to the occurrence or contact with
the parties, has the greatest concern with
specific issues raised in litigation.
c. Since the locus of the tort was in New
Jersey, as was the plaintiffs domicile. New
Jersey had the most substantial interest in the
issue whether the plaintiff should have a
remedy in tort. New Jersey law, which
precludes recovery in negligence and strict
liability for purely economic loss, should
apply to tort claims.
d. When deciding contract issues. New York
applies the "paramount interest" test to
determine choice of law. Under this test, the
law of the jurisdiction having the greatest
interest in the litigation is applicable.
e. The court modified the "paramount
interest" test because the agreement expressly
provided that Connecticut law would govern
its construction. Connecticut was the principal
place of business of the aircraft manufacturer.
Therefore, there were sufficient contacts with
the transaction to warrant honoring the
parties' choice of Connecticut law.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.16
Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
868 F.2d 1538
(I Ith Cir. 1989)
1. Site of Crash: Virginia
2. Parties:
INew Jersey plaintiffs sued defendant, a
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
place of business in Florida. It had designed,
manufactured, and tested a plane that crashed
in Virginia.
3. Issue:
Should Virginia or Floridastatute of limita-
tions apply to a personal injury action arising
out of a Virginia airplane crash?
4. Decision:
Remand for application of significant
relationship test.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (§ 6.04):
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Virginia's two-year statute of limitations
applied, rather than Florida's four-year statute,
because under Florida's "borrowing" statute,
the plaintiffs' cause of action arose in
Virginia. Since Florida's significant
relationship test was established after the
district court's opinion, the case was
remanded for new analysis. The appropriate
law is that which exists at the time of an
appeal rather than trial court judgment.
b. The district court might deem Florida to
have a more significant relationship to this
case than Virginia because the plane was
designed, manufactured, and tested in Florida
and the plaintiffs were now residents of
Florida. Florida's four-year statute of
limitation would not bar the plaintiffs' claims.
(Note: The district court's decision is not
available.)
Probably the same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.17
Thornton
V.
Cessna Aircraft Co.,
703 F. Supp. 1228 (D.S.C. 1988),
aff-d 886 F.2d 85
(4th Cir. 1989)
t. Site of Crash: Tennessee
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, a resident of South Carolina,
sued the defendant, Cessna Aircraft
Company. a Kansas corporation with its
principal place of business in Kansas.
3. Issue:
What law should a South Carolina federal
court apply to a wrongful death claim and
related warranty involving a Kansas
manufacturer and arising out of a crash in
Tennessee?
4. Decision:
The Tennessee ten-year statute of repose
governed the tort claim, but South Carolina
law governed the breach-of-warranty claim.
S. Comparison with A.LI. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
A different result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
a. Following Klaxon, South Carolina's lex
loci delicti rule applied. Therefore, the
substantive law of Tennessee and the proce-
dural law of South Carolina applied.
b. A statute of limitation is generally
procedural because it is primarily an
instrument of court management and therefore
affects the remedy rather than the right.
Tennessee's statute of repose for products
liability cases, however, is intended to relieve
defendants of anxiety over liability for long-
past acts. Repose "requires that an action be
brought within a fixed period from some date
unrelated to the accrual of the action, such as
the date of purchase or sale." 703 F. Supp. at
1230. This makes it a substantive statute,
engrafted onto the plaintiff's right created by
law. Thus, Tennessee product liability statute
of repose governed plaintiff's tort claims.
c. With respect to the manufacturer's
warranty, South Carolina law governed, and
the Tennessee statute of repose therefore did
not apply because the decedent resided in
South Carolina and had purchased and
maintained the airplane there. When a plaintiff
asserts his warranty claim under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the forum state will apply
its own law if it has a reasonable relationship
to the contract.
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
No.18
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
Myers
V.
Hayes Int'l Corp.,
701 F. Supp. 618
(M.D. Tenn. 1988)
1. Site of Crash: Kentucky
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Tennessee, sued
defendants, several corporations from
jurisdictions that the court did not disclose
in the published opinion. The defendants
allegedly played some role in the design,
redesign, manufacture, maintenance.
inspection, and sale of an ill-fated plane.
3. Issue:
What law should govern a product
liability action against the manufacturer
instituted in a federal court in Tennessee
arising out of an air crash in Kentucky?
4. Decision:
Kentucky law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule § 6.01(b),
(c):
Analysis
1. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rle.
2. Rationale:
a. Tennessee's statute of repose barring
products liability action more than ten years
after the date of purchase of a defective
product conflicts with Kentucky products
liability law which included a rebuttable
presumption that products beyond a certain
age were safe.
b. Following the Klaxon rule, Tennessee's
lex loci delicti rule required application of the
substantive law of Kentucky, where the crash
occurred, to product liability action.
A different result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
Eininart
V.
Piper Aircraft Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 843
(S.D. Fla. 1987)
1. Site of Crash: Indiana
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Indiana. sued
defendant, a Florida corporation with its
principal place of business in Florida.
3. Issue:
What law should govern compensatory
relief and punitive damage claims instituted
in a federal court sitting in Florida where
the site of a crash was in Indiana?
4. Decision:
Indiana law governed the action.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Ride
(§ 6.06(c)(3)):
The same result.
No.19
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Under the Klaxon rule, Florida choice-of-
law rules applied.
b. In Florida, the most significant relationship
test would include the following factors:
(I) The crash in Indiana was not fortuitous
because the decedents were all Indiana
residents;
(2) The aircraft was hangared in Indiana for
use by the Piper distributor at the time of the
crash; and
(3) The only contact with Florida was the
defendant's principal place of business there.
c. Indiana had a greater interest than Florida
with regard to the compensatory relief
afforded the decedents' beneficiaries because.
as the state in which the decedents resided
before their deaths, it had a substantial interest
in the nature and extent of their compensatory
relief.
d. Florida allows, while Indiana prohibits, the
recovery of punitive damages. When there is
a true conflict between the corresponding laws
of states having equal interests in an issue of
punitive damages, and when the state of the
place of injury has a strong interest in air
safety, its law (Indiana) will apply.
I
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.20
Price v. Litbon Sys.,
784 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986)
I. Site of Crash: Alabama
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Alabama, sued
defendants (1) International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation (ITT), a Delaware
corporation, with its principal place of
business in New York (ITT manufactured
night vision goggles which were worn by
the crew members of the plane that
crashed); and (2) Litton Systems, Inc., (its
place of incorporation was not identified).
3. Issue:
Which state statute of limitations should
apply to claims for negligence, strict liability
and breach of warranty instituted in a
federal court sitting in Mississippi and
arising out of an air crash in Alabama?
4. Decision:
a. Alabama substantive law applied to tort
claims.
b. The statute of limitations for a tort claim
under Alabama law is substantive and would
therefore be applied by a Mississippi federal
court.
c. A separate analysis on remand, to be
based on the Uniform Commercial Code.
was appropriate for determining which
statute of limitations to apply to breach-of-
warranty claims.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule
(§ 6.01(c)(3), § 6.04)):
The same result as to the tort claims, but
uncertain as to the statute-of-limitations
issue.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Under Klaxon, Mississippi's most
significant relationship test would lead to the
application of Alabama law. The helicopter
flight was to take place entirely within
Alabama and the decedents were stationed in
Alabama at the time of the accident. The
court therefore rejected the plaintiffs'
characterization of the place of the accident as
merely "fortuitous."
b. Ordinarily. Mississippi courts would
apply Mississippi law to procedural issues.
Since Alabama courts construed the two-year
statute of limitations contained in the
Alabama Wrongful Death Act to be
substantive and not procedural, however,
Alabama's shorter statute of limitations would
apply.
c. On breach-of-warranty claims, the
Mississippi statute governing warranty claims
provides that local law applies. The court
concluded that it should follow this explicit
provision, but. also round that the only
connection between the accident and
Mississippi was that Mississippi was the
forum state. Therefore, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to consider whether the'
application of Mississippi law would be
constitutional.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.21
Wert
V.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
634 F. Supp. 401
(E.D. Mo. 1986)
1. Site of Crash: Arizona
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, a member of the Indiana Air Na-
tional Guard, sued defendants (1)
McDonnell Douglas, a Maryland corporation
with its principal place of business in
Missouri- (2) Martin-Baker Aircraft Co..
Ltd. (its place of incorporation was not
identified); and (3) General Electric (its
place of incorporation was not identified).
3. Issue:
What law should govern a wrongful death
action instituted in a federal court sitting in
Missouri where the site of crash was in
Arizona?
4. Decision:
Arizona law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule
(§ 601(c)(4)):
A different result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Following Klaxon and Van Dusen,
I Arizona's choice-of-law rules would apply.
b. Although "the general rule is that little
weight is given to the place of injury in
choice of law determinations," id. at 401, the
place of this accident in Arizona was not
fortuitous, since the training flight took off
and was planned for execution and landing
there.
c. The primary purpose of Indiana's statute
of repose is to limit the liability of Indiana
manufacturers and to conserve the judicial
resources of the Indiana courts. Since the case
was not pending in Indiana and none of the
defendants were domiciled in Indiana. the
court found that "Indiana's interest should be
discounted." Id. at 404.
d. The court concluded that since no other
state had a more significant relationship to the
case than Arizona, its law applied.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.22
Foster
V.
United States.
768 F.2d 1278
(I Ith Cir. 1985)
1. Site of Crash: Wisconsin
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the personal representative of the
decedents' estates, was a Florida resident
who sued the defendant United States
government for alleged negligent provision
of air traffic control services to the crew of
an airplane in the Chicago Air Route Traffic
Control Center.
3. Issue:
What law, Illinois or Florida, should
apply to a wrongful death action instituted
in a federal court sitting in Florida where
the site of the crash was in Wisconsin?
4. Decision:
The law of Illinois, the place of the
alleged misconduct, applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule
h 6.01(c)(4):
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Since Illinois was the place where the act
or omission occurred, the court found that
Illinois law governed, including its choice-of-
law principles.
b. Under Illinois' most significant
relationship test, the following elements were
significant:
(l)The alleged misconduct occurred in Illi-
nois;
(2) The only lineal descendant of the
decedent was a resident of Illinois at the time
of the accident even though she moved to
Florida subsequently; and
(3) The relationship between the parties was
centered in Illinois.
c. Although the estate was to be probated in
Florida and any interest would lake place
there, the court held that the interest of
Illinois in deterring tortious conduct in Illinois
and in compensating its citizens was greater
than Florida's interest in limiting recovery.
Thus, Illinois law applied.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.23
Kinnett
V.
Sky's West Parachute
Center, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 1039
(D. Colo. 1984)
1. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, a Wyoming resident, sued defen-
dants, Sky's West Parachute Center, a
Colorado corporation, and Air U.S., a
Colorado corporation doing business in
several states including Colorado and
Wyoming.
3. Issues:
What law should govern punitive damages
in a wrongful death action instituted in a
federal court sitting in Colorado where the
site of the crash was in Colorado and all the
defendants were Colorado corporations, but
all other significant contacts were in.
Wyoming?
4. Decision:
Wyoming law applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.06(b),
(c)):
A different result.
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. The court held that Colorado's choice-of-
law rules would apply because subject-matter
jurisdiction over the action was based on
diversity of citizenship.
b. Colorado followed the Restatement Second
approach whereby the law of the state where
the injury occurred would apply in a wrongful
death action unless some other state has a
more significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties.
c. The court found that the most significant
contacts in this case were that:
(I) the plaintiffs resided in Wyoming:
(2) the decedent lived in Wyoming:
(3) the decedent purchased his .ticket in
Wyoming from a corporation doing business
there;
(4) the decedent's purpose was to travel
round-trip, commencing and terminating in
Wyoming: and
(5) the accident occurred in Colorado
airspace near the Wyoming border, while the
airplane was returning to Wyoming. Further,
the court stated that Colorado's contact with
this action was merely fortuitous because the
Wyoming-bound airplane collided and crashed
south of the Colorado-Wyoming border.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.24
Saloomey
V.
Jeppesen & Co.,
707 F.2d 671
(2d Cir. 1983)
1. Site of Crash: West Virginia
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, residents of Connecticut, sued
defendant, a Colorado corporation which
produced and supplied navigational charts
that caused a crash.
3. Issue:
Should West Virginia, Connecticut, or
Colorado law apply to product liability and
damage claims in a Connecticut federal
court arising out of crash in West Virginia?
4. Decision:
Colorado law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Following Klaxon, Connecticut choice.-of-
law rules would apply.
b. Although Connecticut courts apply the rule
of lex loci delicti in automobile accident
cases, the Supreme Court of Connecticut had
never had occasion to apply the rule of lex
loci to a wrongful death action arising from
an aviation accident.
c. The federal court predicted that a
Connecticut court would choose to follow the
most significant relationship approach. It
reasoned that, by contrast to automotive
travel, accidents in interstate air travel more
frequently pose situations in which the place
of actual injury is wholly fortuitous and
unimportant.
d. Colorado, rather than West Virginia or
Connecticut law, should apply because the
place of incorporation and principal place of
business of defendant were in Colorado. The
pilot of the plane that crashed had purchased
navigational charts from the defendant in
Colorado,
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.25
Bennett
V.
Enstroon Helicopter Corp.,
679 F.2d 630
(6th Cir. 1982),
cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1210,
103 S. Ct. 1202 (1983)
1. Site of Crash: New Zealand
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of
a New Zealand citizen killed in a helicopter
crash in New Zealand, sued defendant.
Enstrom Helicopter Corporation. a Michigan
corporation.
3. Issue:
What law, Michigan or New Zealand,
should apply to a wrongful death action
before a federal court in Michigan arising
out of a crash in New Zealand?
4. Decision:
New Zealand law applied to bar the
action.
5. Comparison with A.LI.Rule
(§ 6.01(c)(3)):
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
a. Under Michigan's place-of-wrong rule.
New Zealand law would apply.
b. New Zealand no longer permits common-
law personal injury actions. The plaintiff had
already received compensation under New
Zealand's comprehensive no-fault
compensation act and was therefore barred
from further recovery.
c. Even if the court were to apply a more
flexible "dominant contacts" rule, there were
no such dominant contacts in Michigan.
The same result.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.26
Cox
V.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
665 F.2d 566
(5th Cir. 1982)
i. Site of Crash: Idaho
2. Parties:
Texas plaintiffs, the widow and minor
children of a decedent killed in a crash of
his aircraft in Idaho. sued defendant,
McDonnell Douglas, a Maryland corporation
with its principal place of business in
Missouri, where a plane that crashed was
manufactured.
3. Issue:
Should Texas, Idaho, or Missouri law
govern a wrongful death action before a
federal court in Texas arising out of a crash
in Idaho?
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
a. Following Klaxon, Texas choice-of-law
rules would apply.
b. The lex loci delicti rule of Texas would
refer to the law of the state in which the
injury occurred (Idaho), rather than the law of
the state in which the negligent act occurred
(Missouri).
4. Decision:
Idaho law applied.
5. Comparison with A.. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
A different result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.27
Reyno
V.
Piper Aircraft Co..
630 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1980).
rev'd on other grounds.
454 U.S. 235,
102 S. C. 252 (1981)
1. Site of Crash: Scotland
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, a California resident and
personal representative of various Scottish
decedents, sued defendants (1) Piper Aircraft
Corporation (Piper), a Pennsylvania plane
manufacturer; and (2) Hartzell Propeller, Inc.
(Hartzell), an Ohio propeller manufacturer.
3. Issue:
What law should govern a wrongful death
action arising out of a crash in Scoliand in a
Pennsylvania federal court after its transfer
from a California federal court?
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied to both Piper
and Hartzell.
5. Comparison with A.LI.Rule
(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: comparative impairment
analysis and government interest analysis.
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court eventually
held that choice of law was immaterial to its
decision to dismiss the action on the ground
of forum non conveniens. The Court
nevertheless noted in dicta that "Scotland had
a 'very strong interest' in this litigation"
because the plane crashed there. 454 U.S. at
237.
2. Ratioale:
a. Under Klaxon and Van Dusen, California
choice-of-law rules would apply to Piper.
(I) Scotland's interest in the encouragement
of industry by protecting manufacturers and
making it relatively more difficult for consu-
mers to recover, was perceived to be in
conflict with Pennsylvania's adherence to
strict liability, which acted to shift some of
the burdens of injury from consumers to
producers.
(2). Any asserted conflict between U.S. and
Scottish law was, however, false. The appli-
cation of Pennsylvania strict liability standards
to its resident manufacturer would serve its
interest in the regulation of manufacturing.
Scotland's interest in encouraging industry
within its borders would not be impaired by
applying a strict standard of care to a foreign
corporation.
b. Personal jurisdiction over Hartzell,
however, was lacking. Thus, California's
application of choice-of-law rules would not
be proper and Pennsylvania's conflicts rules
applied to Hanzell.
(I) Pennsylvania's approach to choice of
law is quite similar, at least for purpose of
this litigation, to that of California.
(2) In detennining which state had the
greater interest in the application of its law,
the weight of a particular state's contacts must
be measured on a qualitative rather than
quantitative scale.
(3) Under the applicable choice-of-law rules.
Pennsylvania and Ohio had the greatest policy
interest in this dispute.
19941 1051
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.28
Baird
Vt.
Bell Helicopter Textron,
491 F. Supp. 1129
(N.D. Tex. 1980)
1. Site of Crash: Surinam.
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from Canada sued defendants.
Bell Helicopter Textron, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in Texas, and third-party
defendants, all of which were Canadian
corporations.
3. Issue:
What law should apply to a products
liability action instituted by Canadian
citizens in a Texas federal court arising out
of an air crash in Surinam?
4. Decision:
a. Texas law applied to liability aspects of
plaintiff's products liability claims against
manufacturer and manufacturer's claims of
contribution from helicopter owners.
b. Texas law also applied to plaintiffs
pecuniary losses, but Canadian law applied
to nonpecuniary damage claim.
5. Comparison with A.l. Rule (§ 6.01(c),
6.05)):
a. The same result as to Texas defendant.
b. A different result as to Canadian third-
party defendants.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. Because federal jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship, under Klaxon rules,
Texas choice-of-law rules applied.
b. No party contended that Surinam law
should be applied. The location there of the
crash was fortuitous. The only other contact
with Surinam was that a subsidiary of one of
the Canadian defendants was a Surinam
corporation.
c. Both Canada and Texas had important
contacts with this lawsuit. Texas, however,
had more significant interests with regard to
the product liability issue because of its policy
in protecting its citizens from, and
compensating them for, injuries resulting from
defective products and its desire to regulate
the conduct of Texas manufacturers. Also, the
court could more easily administer local
(Texas) law.
d. As to defendant's third-party claims
against the three Canadian defendants, the
interested jurisdictions, again, were Canada
and Texas, both of which were significant
under Section 6 of the Restatement Second.
Texas and Canadian law is quite similar
concerning indemnity and contribution issues.
Texas law applied for these reasons:
(i) Protection of justified expectations
could not be served merely by applying
Canadian law because none of the defendants
had relied on the application of any particular
jurisdiction's contribution statute.
(2) The basic policy behind the law of
contribution would be better served by
applying Texas law because it more precisely
responded to the issues of this case.
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(3) The pro-rata system of damage
attribution under Texas law would lead to
more uniform results than the Canadian
statute, which has the potential for producing
inconsistent verdicts.
(4) Ease of administration.
e. As to the issue of the calculation of non-
pecuniary damage, Canada has a ceiling of
$100,000 while Texas has no ceiling.
Canadian law was applied to this issue
because (I) the plaintiff was a Canadian
citizen and resided there and none of the
interests implicitly furthered by Texas damage
principles applied; (2) Canada had explicitly
disapproved of the possibility of unlimited
recovery for a non-quantifiable injury by
exempting its domiciliary defendants from
excessive liability; and (3) comparative
analysis of the interests and policies strongly
favored the application.of Canadian law.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.29
Kohr
V.
Allegheny Airlines. Inc.,
504 F.2d 400
(7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied.
421 U.S. 975
95 S. Ct. 1974 (1975)
1. Site of Crash: Indiana
.2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from seven states sued Allegheny
Airlines, Inc. (its place of incorporation was
not disclosed in the written opinion) and the
United States.
3. Issue:
What law should apply to a wrongful death
action arising out of an Indiana air crash after
the two defendants had settled out of court
and subsequently sought contribution and
indemnity from two codefendants?
4. Decision:
Federal common law applied. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part
the trial court's judgment for plaintiffs and
remanded for a new trial.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
I. Methodol
2. Rationale:
gY: Federal common law.
For avoiding analysis of complicated
conflict-of-laws problems and the risk of
inconsistent results, a federal law of
contribution and indemnity governing air
collisions is preferable.
(1) "The basis for imposing a federal law of
contribution and indemnity is what we
perceive to be the predominant, indeed almost
exclusive, interest of the federal government
in regulating the affairs of the nation's
airways." 504 F.2d at 403.
(2) "Moreover, the imposition of a federal
rule of contribution and indemnity serves a
second purpose of eliminating inconsistency
of result in similar collision occurrences as
well as within the same occurrence due to the
application of differing state laws on.
contribution and indemnity." Id.
(3) "Given the prevailing federal interest in
uniform air law regulation, we deem it
desirable that a federal rule of contribution
and indemnity be applied." Id.
A different result.
Analysis
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FEDERAL STATUTORY CASES
(Selective coverage: 1980-1993, in reverse chronological order)
No.30
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
Schoenberg v. Erportador,
930 F.2d 777
(9th Cir. 1991)
I. Site of Crash: California
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, two of them residents of
California and the other of Japan. sued
defendant. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V.,
a Mexican corporation of which the
Mexican government owned 51% and which
had an office in San Diego.
3. Issues:
a. Should California or federal common law
govern the choice of law in an action based
on jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act?
b. Does California or Mexican law govern a
wrongful death action arising out of an
airplane crash in California, when the
defendant was not a resident of California?
4. Decision:
a. Federal common law choice-of-law rile
applied.
b. California rather than Mexican law
governed the action.
5. Comparison with A.Li. Rule
h 6.01(c)(4):
The some result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Federal common law.
2. Rationale:
a. Although the general rule is "that a federal
court sitting in diversity applies the conflict of
law rules of the state in which it sits,"
jurisdiction here was based on the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA). Therefore,
federal common law applied.
b. Federal common law follows the approach
of the Restatement Second. [The court cited
Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d
1000, at 1003-04 (91h Cir. 1987).1
c. The Restatement Second presumes that the
law of the place where the injury occurred ap-
plies unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in Section 6'of the
,Restatement. Id.
d. Mexico's policy is to limit the liability of
its resident defendants in wrongful death
actions. California's rule allowing full
recovery serves two policies: to provide full
compensation for the survivors of its residents
and to deter wrongful conduct within its
borders.
e. Mexico does not have a more significant
relationship to this suit than California, the
place of injury. Applying California law in
this case furthers the choice-of-law values of
certainty, predictability, uniformity of result,
and ease in determining and administering the
law.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.31
Barkanic
Y,
General Administration of Civil Aviation of
the People's Republic of China.
923 F.2d 957
(2d Cir. 1991)
1. Site of Crash: China
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, the estates of two American
citizens, sued defendant, General
Administration of Civil Aviation of the
People's Republic of China ("CAAC").
3. Issues:
a. Should New York or federal common
law govern the choice of law in an action
based on jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act ?
b. Should New York or Chinese substantive
law govern a wrongful death action arising
out of an air crash in China ?
4. Decision:
a. New York choice-of-law rules applied.
b. Applying New York choice-of-law rules,
the law of China applied to a wrongful
death action.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule
(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: The Neumejer rules (lex loci
delicti unless the parties are co-domiciliaries).
2. Rationale:
a. Because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) does not contain an express
choice-of-law provision, the coun inferred
from the statutory language a choice-of-law
analysis that best effectuates Congress' overall
intent. The court concluded that the FSIA
requires courts to apply the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state.
b. Applying the Neumeier rules of New York
would be consistent with the treaty law of the
Warsaw Convention, The New York rules
would choose the law of China, limiting
liability to $20.000 per decedent, to govern a
wrongful death action.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.32
Burgio
V.
McDonnell Douglas. Inc.,
747 F. Supp. 865
(E.D.N.Y. 1990)
I. Site of Crash: Louisiana
2. Parties:
Plaintiff. wife and executrix of the estate
of a New York resident, sued defendants
McDonnell Douglas. a Maryland corporation
with a principal place of business in
Missouri; and Douglas Aircraft. a division of
McDonnell Douglas. located in California.
3.. Issues:
a. Should federal. Louisiana or New York
law govern the choice of law in an action
based on jurisdiction tinder the Federal
Reservation Act?
b. Should Louisiana or New York law
govern claims involving a loss of
consortium and wrongful death?
4. Decision:
a. With respect to an air crash on a federal
military base, under the Federal Reservations
Act, Louisiana choice-of-law rules applied.
b. Under Louisiana choice-of-law rules,
New York law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. The parties agreed that a wrongful death
action was controlled by the Federal
Reservations Act because the accident
occurred on a federal military base. In
wrongful death actions this Act requires
application of the law of the state (Louisiana)
in which a federal enclave is located or to
which a federal enclave is adjacent.
b. The court then considered whether to
apply the whole law of Louisiana, including
that state's choice-of-law rules, or only the
internal law of that state. Recognizing that the
purpose of the Federal Reservations Act was
to put ton victims injured on federal land on
an equal footing with those injured outside
federal boundaries, the whole law applied.
c. Turning to Louisiana choice-of-law rules
to determine whether Louisiana or New York
substantive law applied to plaintiff's claims.
the court found that "tre conflicts" existed
with respect to a number of issues.
d. Since the plaintiff's domicile was in New
York. Louisiana had little connection to the
case beyond the situs of the accident there.
Thus, the law of New York, the plaintiffs
domicile and forum, governed damage claims.
A different result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.33
Hensley v. United States,
728 F. Supp. 716
(S.D. Fla. 1989)
1. Site of Crash: New Jersey
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of the
estates of a deceased pilot and passengers
from Florida, sued defendant, United States,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging
negligence of air traffic controllers and the
national weather service meteorologist.
3. Issue:
What law should govern a wrongful death
action arising out of the alleged negligent acts
of employees at a New York weather service
center, under the Federal Tort Claims Act?
I. Methodoloj
2. Rationale:
Analysis
?y: New York's interest analysis.
a. Under the Federal Ton Claims Act, the
"whole law," including the choice-of-law
rules, of the state where the alleged act or
omission occurred governs the rights and
liabilities of the parties.
b. Although the site of crash was in New
Jersey, this accident arose out of the alleged
negligent acts of national weather service
employees at a New York center. The "whole
law" of New York, including its choice-of-law
rules, thus applied to this action.
c. Florida had the greatest interest in this
litigation.
4. Decision:
Florida law applied.
5. Comparison with A.L.L' Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
A different result.
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No.34
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
Harris
V.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze.
820 F.2d 1000
(9th Cir. 1987)
1. Site of Crash: Poland
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs. parents of deceased passenger
and residents of California, sued defendant,
Polskie Linie Lotnicze (Polskie), a Polish
corporation, wholly owned by the govern-
ment of Poland.
3. Issue:
Should California or Polish law govern
damages in a wrongful death action brought
by California residents against the Polish
national airline for death of their son in
Poland?
4. Decision:
Polish law, which was similar to
California law on the issue of damages,
applied.
5. Comparison with A.L. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(1)):
The same result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Federal common law.
2. Rationale:
a. In a case under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), the Klaxon rule does
not apply.
b. Instead, the case came within both the
Warsaw Convention and the FSIA. In the
absence of specific statutory guidance as to
which it should apply, the court turned to
federal common law to supply a choice-of-law
rule.
c. The Restatement Second is a source of
general choice-of-law principles and therefore
an appropriate starting point for applying
federal common law in this area.
d. Poland's relationship to this action was at
least as significant as California's with regard
to the factors listed in Section 6 of the
Restatement Second. California and Poland
had offsetting interests in the parties to the
action.
e. Since the state where the injury occurred
furthers the choice-of-law values of certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result, and
since the state where the injury occurred will
usually be readily ascertainable, Polish law
applied to this case.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.35
Poindexter
Y.
United States,
752 F.2d 1317
(9th Cir. 1984)
1. Site of Crash: Nevada
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Arizona, sued
defendant United States for alleged breach
of duty in Nevada under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
3. Issue:
Should Arizona or Nevada law govern a
wrongful death action in an Arizona federal
court arising out of a crash in Nevada?
4. Decision:
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
The district court, finding that Arizona law
applied because the heirs had received death
benefits in Arizona, had held that the United
States was immune from suit as a statutory
employer under Arizona's workmen's comp-
ensation law. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed because:
a. The plane crash occurred in Nevada. The
whole law of Nevada, including its conflict-
of-laws principles, would govern claims under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
b. Nevada's lex loci delicti rule was
controlling and therefore the Nevada wrongfil
death statute applied.
Nevada law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LL Rule(§ 6.01(c)(1)):
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.36
O'Rourke
V.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc..
730 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1984)
1. Site of Crash: New York
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of
a Greek seaman who died in a June 1975
crash in New York, sued defendant, Eastern
Airlines, Inc., a New York corporation.
3. Issue:
Should New York or Greek law apply to
a wrongful death action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act before a federal court in
New York?
4. Decision:
New York law applied.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
a. "Under the lFederal Tort Claims Act), a
district court must apply the whole law of the
state in which the acts of negligence
occurred." 730 F.2d at 846.
b. The court noted that although New York
was one of the first states to reject the lex loci
approach in favor of a more flexible
methodology, recent state court decisions had
signaled a return to it.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Ride(§ 6.01(c)(0)):
The same result.
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WARSAW CONVENTION-BASED FEDERAL COMMON
LAW CASES
(Selective coverage: 1989-1993)
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
Analysis
No.37
V.
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,
No. 82-CIV-7900,
1992 WL 331092 (S.D.N.Y.)
i. Site of Crash: Former Soviet Union
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the personal representative and
the administratrix of the estate of a New
York citizen, sued defendant, Korean Air
Lines, a Korean corporation with its
principal place of business in South 'Korea.
3. Issues:
a. What law should govern a
determination of damages in a wrongful
death action arising under Warsaw
Convention?
b. Does the Warsaw Convention preclude
the application of Korean law to an action
brought concurrently with one arising under
the Convention?
4. Decision:
a. Federal common law of tons governed.
b. Plaintiff's motion for a ruling that
Korean law governs the availability of
survivor's recovery was denied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule(§6.01(c)(1)):
Application of Project to cases governed
by treaties is uncertain. See text
accompanying note 14.
I. Methodology: Federal common law.
2. Rationale:
a. The Warsaw Convention creates a cause of
action for wrongful death. In such an action,
the federal common law of tons governs the
right to wrongful death recovery.
b. If, therefore, the Warsaw Convention pre-
empts state law, including choice-of-law rules,
a foreign cause of action cannot be brought
concurrently with one under the Convention.
c. Allowing a foreign cause of action would
not only result in inconsistent application of
law to the same accident, but would cause
enormous confusion for an airline in
predicting what law might apply. The
Convention seeks to avoid such inconsistency
and uncertainty.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.38
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on
December 21. 1988.
928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991).
cert. denied sub. nom.
Rein v. Pan Am World Airways.
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991)
1. Site of Crash: Scotland
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, the surviving relatives and
personal representatives of those who died
in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight
103. sued defendants. Pan American World
-Airways. Inc., a New York corporation with
its principal place of business there; and two
Pan Am subsidiary corporations and Pan
Am's parent corporation.
3. Issue:
What law should govern punitive damages
in actions brought under the Warsaw
Convention?
4. Decision:
Federal common law applied.
5. Comparison with A.L. Rule(§6.01(c)(1)):
Application of Project to cases governed
by treaties is uncertain. See text
accompanying note 14.
Analysis
A. Methodology: Federal common law.
B. Rationale:
1. The Warsaw Convention preempts a state
cause of action because differences among
state laws-some of which view punitive
damages as penal in nature, some as
compensatory, and some both-would be
confusing and might undermine the goal of
uniformity in applying the Convention.
2. "[Blecause air carrier liability is a
uniquely international problem requiring
uniform interpretation, the Convention must
be interpreted according to federal common
law." 928 F.2d at 1270.
a. "(Flederal common law of tons does not
contemplate a compensatory clement in a
punitive damages claim." Id.
b. The Convention does not permit
punishment of a defendant or punitive
damages because:
(I) Article 17 of the Convention refers to
"actual harm caused by an accident rather
than generalized legal damages," id. at 1281;
(2) It was highly unlikely that Article 24
(2) of the Convention "was intended by its
drafters to preserve a common law right to
punitive damages," id. at 1284. and
(3) Article 25's "unlimited liability for
willful misconduct" was meant only to refer
to unlimited liability for compensatory
damages.
c. Allowing recovery of punitive damages
would undermine the convention's policies
including:
(I) The goal of establishing a uniform
carrier liability regime because some legal
systems provide for punitive damages and
others do not.
(2) The goal of making airlines insurable,
because if an airline could not find an insurer
willing to sell insurance for punitive damages,
it might choose to terminate international
flights rather than risk bankruptcy with every
flight.
(3) The goal of compensating plaintiffs
quickly with a minimum of litigation.
especially on issues of willful misconduct.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issue and Decision
No.39
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster
of September 1, 1983,
932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied sub. nom.
Dooly v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,
112 S. Ct. 616 (1991)
1. Site of Crash: Former Soviet Union
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs from eight states and three
foreign countries sued defendant. Korean Air
Lines Co., Ltd., a Korean corporation with
its principal place of business in Korea.
3. Issues:
a. What law should govern punitive
damages in a case brought under the
Warsaw Convention?
b. Does the Warsaw Convention bar
recovery of punitive damages?
4. Decision:
a. Federal common law applied to cases
brought under the Warsaw Convention.
b. The Warsaw Convention barred recovery
of punitive damages, and choice-of-law
analysis was not relevant to punitive
damages in cases brought under the Warsaw
Convention.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (§ 6.06(c)):
A different result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Federal common law.
2. Rationale:
a. The language "liable for damage
sustained" in the Convention strongly implies
that the carrier's responsibility is purely
compensatory and extends only to the
reparation of loss from the death or injury of
passengers.
b. The term "damages sustained" refers to
actual harm, not legal damages.
c. The requirement that the damage sustained
result from an accident aboard the aircraft
reinforced the conclusion that recovery was
available only for actual loss since an accident
cannot cause punitive damages.
(Chief Judge Mikva, the only dissenting party
in this case, criticized the In re Lockerbie
decision, 928 F.2d 1267, 1273 (2d Cir. 1991),
inding it astonishing in light of earlier
precedents, and pointed out that he did not
agree with the conclusion that the Warsaw
Convention bars recovery of punitive
damages. Instead, he would have remanded
the case with instructions to engage in a
normal choice-of-law analysis under Klaxon
and Van Dusen., 932 F.2d at 1490-1499).
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STATE CASES
(Selective coverage: 1960-1993, in alphabetical order of the states)
Choice-of-Law Facts, Analysis
Issues and Decision
No.40 1. Methodology: Lex loci delicti.
Alabama
2. Rationale:
Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
581 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1991) Modem approaches are neither less
1 confusing nor more certain than Alabama's
1. Site of Crash: Florida traditional approach.
2. Parties:
Alabama plaintiffs sued the following
defendants:
a. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing I
Company, a Minnesota Corporation with its
principal place of business there. It was the
designer and manufacturer of a flight
instrument called a "Stormscopc."
b. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, the
designer and manufacturer of the plane that
crashed (neither the place of incorporation
nor the principal place of business was
disclosed by the court).
3. Issue:
Should Alabama or Florida law apply to a
wrongful death case by an Alabama court
where the site of crash was in Florida?
4. Decision:
Florida law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LL. Rule (§ 6.01):
Uncertain.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
AnalysisChoice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.4
Alaska
maO. Ehredt
V.
DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada,
705 P.2d 446
(Alaska 1985)
I. Site of Crash: Alaska
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the widow of an air taxi pilot
killed in a crash whose personal represen-
tative and family were in Florida, brought a
wrongful death action against defendants, (I)
the pilot's employer. M.O. Ehredt d/b/a Air
Taxi, an Alaska corporation with its principal
place of business there, and (2) airplane
manufacturer, DeHavilland Aircraft
Company of Canada, Ltd., a Canadian
corporation with its principal place of
business there.
3. Issue:
Does Alaska or Florida law govern the
issue of damages related to a crash in
Alaska?
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
Alaska had the most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties because:
a. The crash occurred in Alaska, on a flight
entirely within the state;
b. The deceased pilot's employer was an
Alaska domiciliary doing business in Alaska;
and
c. The employment relationship between the
pilot and his employer was centered there.
The Florida residence of the pilot's personal
representative and family did not compel the
application of Florida law.
4. Decision:
Alaska's damage law applied.
5. Comparison with A.L IRule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.42
Arizona
Bryant
V.
Silverman,
703 P.2d 1190
(Ariz. 1985)
I. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parries:
Plaintiffs, domiciled in Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas, sued defendants (1) Sun
West Airlines, an Arizona corporation with
its principal place of business in Phoenix and
servicing cities in New Mexico, Colorado
and Arizona; (2) Piper Aircraft Corporation,
a Pennsylvania corporation; and (3) Edo
Corporation, a New York corporation.
3. Issue:
Should Arizona or Colorado wrongful
death law govern compensatory and punitive
damage issues?
4. Decision;
Arizona law applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll. Rule(§§ 6.01(c)(4), 606(b)(c)):
The same result on compensatory dam-
ages, but either an uncertain or perhaps
different result on punitive damages.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. The states having relevant contacts were
Arizona and Colorado:
(1) The place where the injuries occurred
was Colorado.
(2) One of the plaintiffs was domiciled in
Arizona at the time of the crash, as was her
deceased husband who died in the crash.
(3) Sun West was incorporated and had its
principal place of business in Arizona.
(4) Since the decedent purchased his ticket
in Colorado, the contractual relationship
between the decedent and Sun West was
centered in Colorado (of relatively low
importance to this case).
b. Under the facts of this case, domicile
carried great weight in choosing the
appropriate law. Less significant were the
place of injury and the contractual relationship
between the decedent and Sun West.
Although Colorado was the state of injury, it
did not have a strong interest in compensation
because the injured plaintiffs were non-
residents and the place of injury was fortu-
itous.
c. Under Section 6 of the Restatement
Second, the harmonious relationship or
commercial interaction between Arizona and
Colorado would be fostered by applying
Arizona law. Predictability and uniformity of
result are largely irrelevant since airplane
accidents are not planned. Protection of
justified expectations also is of little
importance since airplane crash accidents are
unanticipated acts.
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d. "The basic policies underlying tort law *are
to provide compensation for the injurd
victims, and to deter intentional and
deliberately tortious conduct by imposing
punitive damages." Id. at 1195. Both
Arizona and Colorado provide compensation
for injured victims. Only Arizona allows
punitive damages to deter similar future
conduct. Thus, the basic policies of tort law
were better fostered by applying Arizona law.
e. Arizona had a strong policy interest in
fully compensating an injured plaintiff to
make him whole because he was a
domiciliary. Colorado limits compensatory
damages for wrongful death to a plaintiff's
net pecuniary loss in order to protect a
Colorado defendant from large verdicts. Since
Sun West was domiciled in Arizona,
Colorado's policy of limited liability was not
relevant. Thus, Arizona's interest in
compensating an Arizona plaintiff was
stronger than Colorado's interest in limiting
damages.
f. Texas and New Mexico, like Arizona,
allow recovery for intangible personal losses.
Thus, the policies underlying wrongful death
statutes relating to compensatory damages in
Arizona, Texas and New Mexico do not
differ.
g. After considering the relevant factors and
I the interests of both states, the court
concluded that Arizona had the greatest
interest in having its law applied to this case.
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AnalysisChoice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.43
California
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court,
132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976)
1. Site of Crash: New Mexico
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs were California administratrixes of
New Mexico decedents.
The defendants were (I) Beech Aircraft
Corporation. a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Kansas, the
producer and manufacturer of the plane that
crashed; and (2) Adams-Rite, a California
corporation with its principal place of business
there, the designer and manufacturer of a door
latching mechanism used in the ill-fated plane.
The alleged cause of the crash was the
defective design of the plane and door latching
mechanism.
3. Issue:
Should California or New Mexico law apply
to determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties in a wrongful death case consolidated
in a California court that arose out of a crash
in New Mexico?
I. Methodology: Governmental
analysis.
interest
2. Rationale:
a. Generally, a California court.will apply its
own rule of decision unless a party litigant
timely invokes the law of a foreign state. In
such event the party must demonstrate that the
latter rule of decision would further the
interest of the foreign state and therefore
would be appropriate law for the forum to
apply. Therefore, California law would apply
unless the petitioner could show that New
Mexico law would further the interest of the
foreign state and would be the appropriate law
for the forum to apply.
b. There was no choice-of-law issue as to the
existence of a wrongful death claim against
the aircraft manufacturer because after the
trial, the laws of the two states in question
(California and New Mexico) became
identical.
c. As to the product liability and indemnity
issues, California had rejected the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement of
New Mexico law in a strict liability case.
4. Decision:
California law applied.
5. Comparison with A.L. Rule (§ 6 .01(c)(4 )):
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.44
Colorado
Murphy
Colorado Aviation, Inc..
588 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1978)
I. Site of Crash: Virginia
2. Paries:
Plaintiffs were California residents. The
defendant, Colorado Aviation, was incorpo-
rated in Colorado.
3. Issue:
Should Colorado or Virginia law apply to
a wrongful death action in a Colorado court
where the site of the crash was in Virginia?
4. Decision:
Colorado law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LJ. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
analysis.
2. Rationale:
a. Applying the principles in § 175 of the
Restatement Second to define the interest and
policies of the various states, the court, having
found that plaintiff and his family were
California residents, ruled that Virginia's
only interest was as the situs of the crash.
Contrasted with this were the facts that the
aircraft was registered and hangared in
Colorado, and had been first entrusted to a
pilot in Colorado who did not have an
instrument rating.
b. The court concluded that Colorado had an
interest outweighing that of the other states, to
see that domestic corporations, owning
sophisticated aircraft hangared there, do not
negligently entrust them to pilots without the
appropriate flight training.
The same result.____________ 
______-
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.45
Florida
Proprietors Iss. Co.
V.
Valsecchi.
435 So. 2d 290
(Fla. App. 1983)
I. Site of Crash: North Carolina
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of
three decedents, were residents of New York
and Massachusetts. Defendants were a
Florida aviation company and its air personnel.
The alleged cause of the crash was attributed
to the defendants' failure to maintain the
aircraft's electrical system while the aircraft
was hangared in Florida.
Analysis
I .Methodology:
test.
Most significant relationship
2.Rationale:
a. As the crash site, North Carolina bore only
a fortuitous, insignificant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties.
b. The significant contacts were: the
initiation of the trip in Florida; the Florida
residence of the defendants; and the Florida
relationship between the parties.
c. In sum, North Carolina had nothing to do
with the parties or the cause of the accident.
Its ties to the litigation were too insignificant
to warrant the application of its law.
3. Issue:
Should North Carolina or Florida law apply
to a wrongful death action before a Florida
court arising out of a crash in North Carolina?
4. Decision:
Florida law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LL Rule (§ 601I(c)(4)):
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.46
Georgia
Risdon Enterprises, Inc.
V.
Colemill Enterprises, Inc.,
324 S.E.2d 738
(Ga. App. 1985)
1. Site of Crash: South Carolina
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, Risdon Enterprises, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business
in South Carolina, sued South Carolina
individual defendants and corporate defen.
dants, Colemill Enterprises, which were
residents of South Carolina, Tennessee and
North Carolina. The primary negligent
conducts of defendants occurred in Georgia
and South Carolina.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2.Rationale:
The place of wrong is the place where the
injury sustained was suffered rather than the
place where the act initiating the events
leading to the injury was committed. In this
case, the last event necessary to make
defendants liable for the alleged tort, namely,
the airplane crash, occurred in South Carolina.
Therefore, South Carolina law applied.
3. Issue:
What law should be applied to a tort action
in which it is alleged that the defendants'
negligent conduct in Georgia caused plaintiff's
employee to be killed in a South Carolina
airplane crash?
4. Decision;,
The substantive law of South -Carolina.
where the crash occurred, controlled.
5. Comnparison withi A.1,. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(3)):
I The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.47
Idaho
Johnson v. Pischke,
700 P.2d 19 (Idaho 1985)
1. Site of Crash: Idaho
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, all from Saskatchewan, brought
claims for worker's compensation, personal
injuries, and wrongful death against the
following defendants: (1) The Saskatchewan
survivors of the owner and pilot of the plane
that crashed; and (2) Cessna Aircraft, a Kansas
corporation with its principal place of business
in Kansas, which manufactured and designed
the plane.
3. Issue:
What law should govern worker's com-
pensation claims of personal injury and
wrongful death claims brought by Saskatch-
ewan residents before an Idaho court arising
out of an Idaho crash?
4. Decision:
a. Worker's compensation claims of personal
injury against survivors of the owner of a
plane were barred under Saskatchewan law;
b. Saskatchewan's one-year statute of limita-
tions was applicable to wrongful death claims
against the owner's survivors; and
c. Idaho's two-year wrongful death statute of
limitations was applicable to claims against a
Kansas corporation which had manufactured
and designed a plane.
5. Comparison with A.LL Rule (§§ 6.01(c)(2).
6.04, 6.05):
The same result on worker's compensation
claims, but a different result on personal injury
and wrongful death claims.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a, Worker's compensation claims against the
survivors of the owner and pilot of the plane:
(I) Saskatchewan worker's compensation
law differs from Idaho's. Saskatchewan had a
significant interest in controlling the rights of
injured employees to compensation.
(2) "Saskatchewan's policy of insulating all
covered employers from civil liability if they
pay into and participate in its worker
compensation program would be subverted by
the application of Idaho law to this
controversy." Id. at 23.
(3) The plaintiff had elected to proceed
under and accept the benefits of Saskatchewan
law. Since the Worker's Compensation Board
had exclusive jurisdiction and its decision was
final and not open to review in any court,
claims against the survivors of the owner and
pilot were barred.
b. Personal injury and wrongful death claims
against the survivors of the owner and pilot of
the plane:
(I) The Saskatchewan Fatal Accidents Act
contains a one-year statute of limitations
while Idaho's wrongful death statute has a
two-year statute.
(2) This action was commenced more than
one year but less than two years after
accident. The most significant contacts were
with Saskatchewan because of common
domiciles and location of beneficiaries there.
(3) Thus. Saskatchewan's one-year statute of
limitations barred wrongful death claims.
c. The wrongful death claim against Cessna:
(I) "As the state where the injury occurred,
Idaho's law, according to the Restatement
(Second], should apply unless there is another
state with a more significant relationship." Id.
at 24.
(2) The place of injury was Idaho.
Following the crash, Idaho expended funds
for locating and disposing of the remains from
the downed aircraft. The funds came from
fees paid by Idaho pilots and taxpayers.
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(3) Although Cessna designed and made the
plane in Kansas, its corporate accountability
did not cease at the Kansas border. Cessna
would continue to have responsibility for any
faulty design and construction after the plane
left its control in any place where the plane
would be used. In the absence of a common
domicile, Idaho, the place of injury, bore the
most significant relationship to the issues.
(4) Under the most significant contacts
analysis, Idaho's two-year statute of
limitations applied to the wrongful death
cause of action against Cessna.
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
NoA8
Louisiana
Williams
V.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
234 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 234 So. 2d 522 (1970)
1. Site of Crash: Mississippi
2. Parties:
Plaintiff and defendant were both Louisiana
residents.
3. Issue:
Is Louisiana's legal interest in a wrongful
death action substantive and therefore gov-
erned by the lex loci delicti rule or procedural
and therefore governed by the law of the
forum?
4. Decision:
a. Legal interest in a tort action was a
matter of substantive rather than procedural
law.
b. Interest was computed under Mississippi
rather than Louisiana law,
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(2)):
A different result.
1. Methodolo
2. Rationale:
Analysis
gy: Lex loci delicti rule.
a. Whether interest is recoverable upon a
judgment recovered in a wrongful death
action is governed by the law of the place of
the fatal injury.
b. "The general rule, which is followed by
Louisiana courts, is that the question of a
legal interest in a tort action is a matter of
substantive rather than procedural law." 234
So. 2d at 524.
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AnalysisChoice-of-Law Pacts,
Issues and Decision
No.49
Massachusetts
Cohen
V.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
450 N.E.2d 581
(Mass. 1983)
I. Site of Crash: Illinois
.2. Parties:
Plaintiff, the executor of the estate of an
-airplane crash victim's mother who was a
Massachusetts resident, sued defendant.
McDonnell Douglas, a Maryland corporation
with its principal place of business in
Missouri.
3. Issue:
What law should Massachusetts apply with
respect to compensatory and punitive damage
claims against a Maryland corporation for
breach of warranty?
4. Decision:
Massachusetts law governed the action.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Ride (§ 6.06(c)):
A different result.
d. In this case, Massachusetts bore an
appropriate relation to the plaintiffs claim
since the injury to the victim's mother
occurred in Massachusetts where she learned
of the death of her son and where she died
after suffering several angina attacks. The
court concluded that no other state appeared
to have a more significant interest in the case.
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lest.
2. Rationale:
a. Conflict-of-laws issues arising in actions
inder the UCC are resolved by it.
b. In the absence of an agreement between
the parties as to which state's law shall
govern, the provisions of the Massachusetts
UCC applied to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to that state. Thus,
"resolution of the choice-of-law issue depends
on the interpretation of the words 'appropriate
relation.'" Id. at 583.
c. In determining which states bear an
appropriate relation to the plaintiff's claim, it
is appropriate to view the choice-of-law issue.
in light of choice-of-law principles applicable
in tort actions, since a claim for breach of
warranty of merchantability is in essence a
tort claim under the precedents of
Massachusetts.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.50
Michigan
Branyan
V.
Alpena Flying Service, hic..
236 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. App. 1976)
1. Site of Crash: Virginia
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, Michigan residents, sued
defendant, Alpena Flying Service, a Mich-
igan corporation with its principal office and
facilities in Michigan.
3. Issue:
Whether limitation of plaintiff's damages
should be determined in accordance with
Michigan or Virginia law?
4. Decision:
Michigan law applied.
5. Comparison with ALl. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(2)):
Analysis
I. Methodology:
"[The strict lex loci delicti rule should be
abandoned in favor of a more flexible rule
that permits analysis of the policies and
interests underlying the particular issue before
the court." Id. at 742-43.
2. Rationale:
Where the only significant interest of
Virginia in a wrongful death action was as the
place where an airplane accident occurred, the
measure of damages to be recovered was to
be determined in accordance with the law of
Michigan, which was the domicile of dece-
dents, their families, and the defendant.
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
Mississippi
McDaniel
V.
Ritter,
556 So. 2d 303 (Miss. 1989)
I. Site of Crash: Missouri
2. Parties:
Mississippi plaintiffs, personal represen-
tatives of the estates of a passenger killed in a
crash sued defendants: (I) the estate of the
pilot, who was from Tennessee, (2) Southern
Institute of Aviation (SIA) Inc. d/b/a Memphis
Jet Center, a Tennessee corporation with its
principal place of business in Memphis: (3)
Memphis Aviation, d/bla Memphis Jet Center,
a Tennessee corporation affiliated with SIA
and responsible for the maintenance; and (4)
the owner of the ill-fated aircraft who was a
Tennessee resident.
3. Issue:
Should Mississippi or Tennessee law apply
to a wrongful death action by a Mississippi
court when the site of crash was in Missouri?
4. Decision:
Tennessee law applied.
5. Comparison with ALl. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
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Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
test.
2. Rationale:
a. The states having relevant contacts were
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Missouri:
(1) the tort occurred in Missouri;
(2) plaintiffs' decedent was a resident ofMississippi-,
(3) plaintiffs were all Mississippi residents:
and
(4) the aircraft that crashed was owned by a
Tennessee defendant. It was registered in
Tennessee and hangared at the Memphis,
Tennessee, airport; the lessors of the aircraft,
the Memphis Jet Center Companies were
Tennessee corporations centered in Memphis:
the pilot was a Tennessee resident; the
pilot/passenger relationship was established
in Memphis; and the interstate trip began and
was to have ended in Memphis.
b. Both in number and significance, the
relevant contacts considered as a whole
suggested that, vis-a-vis Mississippi or
Missouri, Tennessee was the state with the
most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Choicc-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.52
New Mexico
First Nat'l Bassk
Y.
Benson,
553 P.2d 1288
(N.M. App.), cert. denied,
558 P.2d 1288 (1976)
1. Site of Crash: New Mexico
2. Parties:
Both plaintiffs and defendats were
residents of Missouri.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti.
2. Rationale:
a. The precedent of New Mexico indicates
that the rights and liabilities of parties in
automobile accidents, as a general rule, are
determined by the laws of the state where the
accident occurred.
b. A modification of the lex loci delicti rule
was necessary, but there was a wide
divergence of views on how to accomplish a
just result. In the present case, the New
Mexico court reasoned that it had no authority
to change the lex loci delicti rule.
3. Issue:
What law should apply to a wrongful
death action instituted by Missouri plaintiffs
in a New Mexico court arising out of an air
crash in New Mexico?
4. Decision:
New Mexico law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule(§ 6.01(c)(2)):
A different result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.53
New York
Analysis
1. Methodology: Interest analysis.
2. Rationale:
Long
V.
Pan American World Airways. Inc..
213 N.E.2d 796
(N.Y. 1965)
I. Site of Crash: Maryland
2. Parties:
Pennsylvania plaintiffs sued defendant,
Pan American World Airways, a New York
corporation with its principal place of
business there.
3. Issue:
Does Pennsylvania or Maryland law apply
to a wrongful death action instituted in a
New York court by Pennsylvania plaintiffs
arising out of Maryland air crash?
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied.
5. Comparison with A.I Rule(§ 6.01(c)(4)):
The same result.
a. New York, the forum, was a disinterested
third state.
b. Both Pennsylvania and Maryland permit
recoveries for wrongful death, but the
Maryland law creates a cause of action only
for the surviving spouse, parent, or child of
the deceased, or a person who was wholly
dependent on him. "On the other hand, in
Pennsylvania. when a decedent is not survived
by designated relatives or dependents, his
estate is entitled to a limited recovery for
wrongful death and the plaintiffs would be
proper parties to bring these suits." Id. at 797.
c. Since a Pennsylvania citizen had met an
untimely death allegedly as the result of a
New York defendant's wrongdoing in the
course of business, Pennsylvania had an
interest in the correct application of its
wrongful death statute.
d. The decedents purchased their round-trip
tickets in Pennsylvania and the flight began
and was to terminate there. Having solicited
interstate passengers in Pennsylvania, the
defendant had no cause to complain about the
application of Pennsylvania law.
e. In contrast. Maryland's sole relationship
with the occurrence was the fortuity of the
crash there.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.54
New York
Wood
v.
American Airlines, Inc.,
426 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
I. Site of Crash: Virgin Islands
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, Alabama residents and parents of
the Tennessee decedent, sued defendant,
American Airlines, a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in New York.
3. Issue:
Should Virgin Islands, New York, or
Tennessee law apply to a wrongful death claim
instituted in New York by a Tennessee estate
and arising out of a crash in the Virgin
Islands?
4. Decision:
Tennessee law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(4)):
A different result.
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.55
Ohio
Moats
V.
Metropolitan Batik
319 N.E.2d 603 (Oh. 1974)
1, Site of Crash: Pennsylvania
2. Parties:
Both plaintiff and defendant were residents
of Ohio.
3. Issue:
Should Ohio or Pennsylvania substantive
law apply in an Ohio wrongful death action
where the site of a crash was in Pennsylvania?
4. Decision:
Ohio substantive law governed the action.
5. Comparison with A.L. Rule (§ 6.0)(c)(2)):
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: New York's "principle of
grouping of contacts."
2. Rationale:
Under the circumstances presented.
Tennessee had the greatest concern and most
intimate relationship with the matter, because:
the Virgin Islands crash site was purely
adventitious; the decedents' change of planes
in New York was likewise fortuitous, and if
New York or Virgin Islands law were to
apply, "the airline would have found the
disposition of this case less expensive because
of the fact that decedent and his wife were
both killed in the crash, a holding, in effect,
that the lives of two were worth less than the
life of one." Id. at 195..
Analysis
I. Methodology: Most significant relationship
analysis.
2. Rationale:
a. The rule of lex loci delicti is no longer
automatic. That Ohio was the place of injury
was not.the single determining element which
should influence the choice of law. Ohio also
had an interest as the forum in advancing its
existing legislative policy.
b. Pennsylvania had little interest in having
its law applied. Both decedents were residents
of Ohio, the aircraft was owned by an Ohio
corporation, it was hangared there, and the
administration of the estate of the deceased
Ohio residents was of direct concern to Ohio.
The only significant interest of Pennsylvania
in this lawsuit was as the place where the
accident occurred, a factor which was
insufficient to outweigh the other
considerations.
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Choice-of-Law Facts.
issues and Decision
No.56
Oklahoma
Brickjner v. Gooden.
525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974)
I. Site of Crash: Mexico
2. Parties:
Both plaintiffs and defendants
dents of Oklahoma.
were resi-
3. Isste:
Should Oklahoma or Mexican law apply in
three separate tort actions for damages as n
result of an airplane accident occurring in
Mexico?
4. Decision:
I. Methodolo
analysis.
2. Rationale:
Analysis
gy: Most significant relationship
a. The law of the place of wrong is not
necessarily the applicable law for all tort
actions in Oklahoma.
b. All the parties were and still are residents
of Oklahoma: the aireraft was hangared and
registered in Oklahoma: and the trip
originated in Oklahoma and was to end in
Oklahoma. Oklahoma therefore had the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and
the panics.
Oklahoma laws applied.
5. Comparison withI ALl Rule (§ 6.01(c)(2)):
The same result. -_________
Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.57
Oregon
DeFoor v. Leinatta,
437 P.2d 107 (Or. 1968)
I. Site of Crash: California
2. Parties:
Both plaintiff and defendant were residents
of Oregon.
3. Issue:
Should the Oregon or the California
wrongful-death statute apply?
4. Decision:
The Oregon statute applied.
5. Comparison with A.LI. Rule (§ 6.01(c)(2)):
The same result.
Analysis
1. Methodology: Most significant relationship
analysis.
2. Rationale:
a. Both the plaintiff and defendant were
domiciled in Oregon. Thus. any insurance
involved in this litigation was presumably
procured in Oregon.
b. The economic impact upon any judgment
collected in Oregon would be felt there
primarily.
c. Oregon's interest in providing for recovery
of damages for the wrongful death of its
citizens was fully served by applying the
Oregon law.
d. California. on the other hand, had no
significant interest.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.58
Pennsylvania
Griffith
V.
United Air Unes. hic.,
203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964)
I. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, executor of the estate of a Pen-
nsylvania resident killed in air crash, sued the
defendant. United Air Lines (United), a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois.
3. Issue:
What law should apply to damage claims
instituted in a Pennsylvania court where the
site of crash was in Colorado?
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied.
5. Comparison wit/ A.LL. Rie (§ 6.01 (c)(4)):
A different result.
I. Methodoloi
2. Rationale:
Analysis
ry: Government interest analysis.
a. Following Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279 (N.Y. 1963) the court stated, "the strict
lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in
Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule
which permits analysis of the policies and
interests underlying the particular issue before
the court." 203 A.2d at 805.
b. The site of the crash was purely fortuitous.
c. The policies underlying the Colorado
statute which limits the amount of recovery
might be intended to protect Colorado
defendant from large verdicts against them.
However, United was not domiciled there.
d. Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of
recovery, on the other hand, was great. The
relationship between decedent and United was
entered into in Pennsylvania. The domicile of
decedent and his family was vitally concerned
with the administration of decedent's estate
and the well-being of the surviving
dependents to the granting full recovery,
including expected earnings. Therefore,
Pennsylvania had a stronger interest in having
its law applied.
Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.59
Pennsylvania
Kuchinic
V'.
McCrory
222 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1966)
I. Site of Crash: Georgia
2. Parties:
Both plaintiffs and defendant were residents
of Pennsylvania.
3. Issue:
Should Pennsylvania or Georgia law
determine the legal effect of a host-guest
relationship in an airplane?
Analysis
1. Methiodology: Government interest analysis.
2. Rationale:
Georgia's only contact with the case was as
the fortuitous situs of accident. Pennsylvania
was, however, the place where a host-guest
relationship was established and where it was
intended to terminate. Pennsylvania was also
the domicile of all of the aircraft's occupants.
Pennsylvania law therefore applied, under
which representatives of deceased passengers
could have recovered from the estate of a
deceased pilot upon a finding of simple
negligence, rather than Georgia law, which
requires a guest to prove gross negligence
. before recovering damages from a host.
4. Decision:
Pennsylvania law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LL. Rule (9 6.01(c)(2)):
The same result.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
South Dakota
Heidemann Y. Rohl,
194 N.W.2d 164
(S.D. 1972)
I. Site of Crash: Nebraska
2. Parties:
Both plaintiffs and defendants were South
Dakota residents.
3. Issue:
Does Nebraska or South Dakota law apply
to a wrongful death action instituted by
South Dakota plaintiffs arising out of a
Nebraska air crash?
4. Decision:
Nebraska law applied.
5. Comparison with A.L. Rule
(5 6.01(c)(2)):
The same result.
Choice-of-Law Facts.
Issues and Decision
No.61
Texas
Mormon
V.
Mustang Aviation. ic.,
430 S.W.2d 182
(Tex. 1968)
I. Site of Crash: Colorado
2. Parties:
Plaintiffs, residents of Texas and Illinois,
sued the defendant. Mustang Aviation. a Texas
corporation with its principal place of business
them.
3. Issue:
Should the law of Colorado, the place of the
accident, or the law of Texas. the forum,
apply?
4. Decision:
Colorado law applied.
5. Comparison with A.LL Rule (§ 6.01(c)(2)):
A different result.
I. Methodol
2. Rationale:
1083
Analysis
gy: Lex loci delicti.
a. Although there is dissatisfaction with the
lex loci delicti rule, there is also a reluctance
on the part of many courts to adopt a modem
approach because modern approaches
generally set forth theory and concepts rather
than rules that a court can reliably follow. "As
a result, there is considerable confusion and
inconsistency of application." Id. at 169.
b. By contrast, the traditional place of wrong
rule enhances certainty, simplicity, and case
of application.
Note: In Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc.,
488 N.W.2d 63 (S.D. 1992), the Supreme
Court of South Dakota abandoned the lex loci
delicti rule and adopted the "most significant
relationship" analysis.
4.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Lex loci delicti rule.
2. Rationale:
An action for wrongful death did not exist
at common law. Since the Texas wrongful
death statute does not have extraterritorial
force, the law of Colorado. the place of the
airplane crash, rather than that of Texas
applied.
Note: In Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. 1979). the Supreme Court of Texas
held: (I) a statute governing actions for death
or personal injury caused by the wrongful act
outside Texas compels the application of the
lex loci delicti rule only in cases brought on
statutory cause of action; and (2) in the
future, all conflicts cases sounding in tort
would be governed by the most significant
relationship test.
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Choice-of-Law Facts,
Issues and Decision
No.62
Utah
Jackett
V.
Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power,
771 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1989)
I. Site of Crash: Utah
2. Parties:
Plaintiff, California resident, sued defendant,
Los Angeles Department of Water & Power, a
California governmental entity, for injuries
caused by alleged negligent maintenance and
operation of the helicopter that crashed.
3. Issue:
Should California or Utah statute of
limitations apply to a negligence case insti-
tuted by a California plaintiff before a Utah
court arising out of an air crash in Utah?
4. Decision:
California law applied.
5. Comparison with A.Ll.
and § 6.04):
Rule (§ 6.01(c)(2)
The same result.
Analysis
I. Methodology: Comity.
2. Rationale:
a. Although the limitations period of a forum
generally applies, a forum state may extend
sovereign immunity to a sister state as a
matter of comity.
b. In determining whether to extend comity
in a particular case, the courts focus on a
variety of public policy concerns which
include: "to give primary regard to the rights
of their own citizens; to foster cooperation,
promote harmony and build goodwill with
sister states; to have claims against a state
litigated by that state's own courts; and to
prevent forum shopping and avoid practical
problems involved in enforcing a judgment by
one state against another." Id. at 1076
(citations omitted). "Of primary importance
is whether the public policies of the forum
state would be contravened if comity were
extended." Id.
c. Comity was therefore appropriate because:
(I) Both California and Utah have similar
immunity statutes, each with a two-year
limitations period. Such a statute would be
applied to Utah governmental entities sued in
Utah as well as California entities sued in
California.
(2) Utah had little interest in litigating this
dispute because both parties were residents of
California and the fortuitous occurrence of the
crash in Utah was not a compelling reason for
its courts to accept jurisdiction there.
(3) Extending comity in this case prevented
forum shopping because it was only after
plaintiff missed California's two-year's statute
of limitations that he filed suit in Utah.
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